krisis.org
The Metamorphoses of God
On the intrinsic connection between religion and capitalism
by Norbert Trenkle
This text is based on a Zoom lecture given on May 31, 2021, which can be viewed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6SNtfSUXi4o
[This text posted on 9/23/2021 is translated from the German on the Internet, www.krisis,org.]
1. The rise of neo-religious forms of consciousness, movements, and fundamentalisms in recent decades was initially met with great astonishment by the liberal-democratic and left-wing public. Until the 1980s and 1990s, the prevailing view was that the spread of capitalist production and lifestyles would gradually push back religion and religious thinking. Behind this was the classic modernization theory idea that capitalism is a thoroughly rational system and goes hand in hand with a secular lifestyle that will ultimately cause religion to disappear. Against this backdrop, the widely observed “return of religion” has logically been perceived as the intrusion of pre-modern, traditional forms of thought and consciousness into the process of modernity.
Liberals and parts of the traditional left are taking this as an opportunity to uphold what they consider to be the central achievements of capitalist modernity: secularization and the “values of the Enlightenment.” If necessary, these are to be defended with all severity against all those forces that supposedly stand for a relapse into pre-modern and archaic patterns, especially against “Islam,” which is identified as a particular threat.
On the other hand, however, there has also been a growth in the camp of those who are fundamentally positive about the advance of supposedly pre-modern, religious ways of thinking and ideologies, because they see this as confirmation of their own anti-modernist worldview, according to which modern rationality is “soulless” and “rootless” and belongs on the scrap heap of history. They oppose “Islam” (or what they understand it to be) only because they see it as a threat to “the West.” They see this as a wake-up call to finally return to the supposedly unchanging core of their “own” (Christian-Western, German, Polish, Hungarian, Russian, etc.) culture (Trenkle 2008).
2. Both perspectives ideologize the phenomenon of religious fundamentalism in their own way. In fact, modern forms of religiosity do not represent a return to traditional patterns of thought and behavior, but can only be explained by the historically specific form of capitalist socialization. What constitutes this form at its core is, first and foremost, the principle of unsociable sociability (Trenkle 2019). People encounter each other as isolated individuals and establish their social connection by relating their private products of labor to each other. On the one hand, this results in personal relationships taking on a foreign and external character; on the other hand, by entering into relationships in this way, people create a social context that confronts them as an alien power, i.e., a specific form of objectified domination that appears “natural” and irrevocable.
This objectification of social relationships has often been described, following Max Weber’s famous formulation, as the “disenchantment of the world.” But this misses the point. For as much as capitalist society functions according to the principle of “objectivity” and “instrumental reason” (Horkheimer), this principle is precisely an expression of the fact that social relations have become independent of their actors and are beyond their conscious control. In this sense, one can say that capitalist society has a specific metaphysical character (Lohoff 2005), i.e., it has quasi-religious traits (cf. the text by Karl-Heinz Lewed in this volume).
However, unlike Marx’s remarks on the fetish character of commodities, people here are not dominated by the products of their minds, which they project onto the heavens, as people in earlier eras were; rather, it is the products of their private labor that develop into a seemingly alien power to which people must submit.
3. This strange reversal also finds its counterpart in people’s minds, i.e., in the way they perceive their social context. Since they do not understand it, it becomes ideologized and mystified. This can happen in different ways. One very common example is the ontologization of bourgeois conditions as “natural” or “human.” Religiously influenced patterns of perception are no less popular. At first glance, these may appear “traditional” and “pre-modern,” but on closer inspection it becomes clear that they can only be adequately explained by the internal logic of the capitalist mode of production and way of life and its historical internal development.
In the early modern period, when the first signs of capitalist relations began to emerge within European feudal society, the ideological underpinnings of the social upheaval that was taking place were still very much shaped by the Christian worldview. Probably the best-known example of this is Protestant ethics, which underpinned the enforcement of capitalist “virtues” such as relentless work ethic and individual success orientation. 1 The bourgeois family model and the associated binary gender identities also initially appeared in Christian guise. While the Gothic and early Renaissance periods saw an iconographic revaluation of the “Mother of God” and the “Holy Family,” the witch hunts brutally contributed to the enforcement of modern gender separation: the creation of rationally constructed “masculinity” went hand in hand with the destruction of the separated, sensual-emotional moments associated with “women.”
The list could go on. But that is not the point here. What is important to note is that the capitalist fetish system developed out of the Christian fetish system. This is not meant merely in the sense of a historical sequence. Rather, certain basic patterns of capitalist socialization are already laid out in monotheism in general and Christianity in particular. This is not to say that capitalism had to develop out of Christianity; there is no such overarching, transhistorical “logic of history.” Nevertheless, there are clear continuities, especially with regard to the constitution of the subject and the creation of the abstract individual (Marx already spoke of the cult of the abstract human being in Christianity2). Of course, it should also be borne in mind that there is no such thing as “Christianity,” but that it is itself subject to permanent historical changes that result from changes in social conditions and power relations and at the same time have an impact on them. Although Protestant ethics has its roots in monastic life, the shift from “inner-worldly” to “outer-worldly asceticism” brought about a fundamental change in the relationship to the world, representing a qualitative break with the medieval universe. Work now became the central star around which the entire society revolved. And as the capitalist mode of production becomes generally accepted, it also reshapes Christian beliefs and transforms them.3 For this reason, modern religiosity can no longer be explained by recourse to traditions and theological interpretations of ancient writings, as is often done today with regard to “Islam”; rather, it must be related to the forms of capitalist socialization and their historical development.
4. Another qualitative break in the relationship between religious ways of thinking and capitalist socialization is marked by the emergence of secular forms of fetishistic world interpretation in the 19th century, which were to become hegemonic from then on. Although these interpretations of the world represent a break with religious content, the Christian faith is incorporated into them in many ways in terms of form. It is no coincidence that the term “secular or this-worldly religions” has become established for ideologies such as nationalism, belief in technical and scientific progress, and the exaltation of work. However, the reason for this continuity is not some remnants of traditional religiosity that still need to be overcome. Rather, the religious exaltation of capitalist categories and institutions points to the fetishistic character of this social configuration.
Nevertheless, one can speak of a turning point in historical development insofar as secular religions no longer refer to any afterlife in their promises of salvation, but present themselves as entirely worldly, even if they actually refer to a form of rule that, due to the independence of social relations, has quasi-metaphysical characteristics. Religion in the narrower sense, i.e., that which adheres to a belief in the afterlife, is being forced onto the defensive in the face of this hegemony of secular religions and is losing its universally binding and independent character as an interpretation of the world. It tends to develop in two directions, at least in capitalist centers. On the one hand, it is transforming into a highly individualized offering of “meaning” for isolated individuals. On the other hand, it is connecting with capitalist institutions and secular religions and becoming integrated into them.
The first tendency is most evident in esotericism. Even its original form, theosophy, is a wild mishmash of set pieces that its founder, Helena Blavatsky, cobbled together in the late 19th century from a wide variety of religions, myths, and magical imaginations. Initially, she was particularly successful among members of the upper middle class (especially women), who were no longer interested in the ossified forms of institutionalized religion but still sought support in some kind of belief in the afterlife. Since then, there has been an explosive proliferation of esoteric groups, sects, and movements, which basically recombine the same basic elements and fill them with current social content. The essential element here is always the conviction of finding “oneself” and gaining direct access as an individual to some kind of “eternal truths,” to the “universe,” or to some kind of “wholeness.” But what was initially at least partly a liberation from the rigid bourgeois conventions of the 19th century—more precisely, a release of abstract individuality—has long since become a mass field of activity for rampant narcissism, which is a core element of the modern subject form (Samol 2016; Bösch 2000).
The second trend is most evident in the connection between institutionalized religions and state rule. In addition to schools and the military, churches played a central role in almost every country in the 19th and 20th centuries in teaching obedience to the state and capitalist work ethics, as well as in enforcing the bourgeois family model and the associated gender identities. In addition, religious motives became part of national identity constructs in many countries, especially insofar as they were suitable for defining boundaries and exclusions in a multi-ethnic environment. On the other hand, there were also connections between religious motives and emancipatory movements, for example in the form of “Christian socialism” or liberation theology. In any case, however, religion survived only by transforming itself into a moment of capitalist socialization.
5. In contrast, the rise of religious fundamentalisms since the end of the 20th century, which supposedly refer to the origins of the “true faith,” may at first glance appear to be a return to archaic and pre-modern forms of religiosity. But appearances are deceiving. These “religionisms” (Lohoff 2008) are, in essence, highly modern. They serve the need for collective identity that arises with the destruction of pre-modern forms of community and the enforcement of isolation as a basic social principle. Identification with an imagined larger entity follows the urge to free oneself from this isolation and the accompanying feeling of powerlessness—which, however, means the very opposite of emancipation in the emphatic sense, because it amounts to the dissolution, standardization, and destruction of the individual. The archetype of this, however, is not found in traditional religions and cultures, but in modern collective identities, especially nationalism, which was a decisive driving force for the capitalization and nationalization of the world in the 19th and 20th centuries.
The appeal to supposedly ancient traditions and mythical origins also points to the modern character of religionisms. For it is one of the basic characteristics of essentialist identity constructs that they always refer to a prior “essence” or some mystified origins that are invented as a counter-image to the ‘artificiality’ and “emptiness” of capitalist rationality and the modern state. When the various religionisms refer to some divine revelations and religious traditions instead of “cultures” and “national peoples,” the content has been replaced, but the basic pattern remains the same. The change in content, however, points to a social change.
Today’s religious fundamentalisms are the heirs of these secular religions, which have lost their credibility in the era of crisis capitalism because they can no longer deliver on their (already questionable) promises for the future (Lohoff 2008; Lewed 2008). This is particularly evident in places where, due to colonialism and post-colonialism, the belated formation of nation states and constitutional states has almost immediately led to their crisis-ridden collapse. It is no coincidence that religionism, especially in its Islamist form, has largely replaced nationalism and the “socialism” associated with it. For it is precisely in times of crisis that isolated individuals feel a growing need for a seemingly protective larger entity, and since there are no longer many points of reference for this in the here and now, collective identity is constructed from the set pieces of the old religions of the hereafter.
6. However, religionism also proves to be highly modern in the ways in which it behaves most archaically. Fundamentalism, which ostensibly wants to return to the “true origins,” is already a form of reaction to the upheaval of all traditional self-evident truths, which, precisely because they were self-evident, did not require rigid dogmatism. And what this dogmatism then calls the “foundation” is nothing more than a rather arbitrary construction that draws on the historical fund of religions, but arranges them according to patterns that are anything but pre-modern. This has been traced in great detail for Islamism in particular (for example by Olivier Roy 2006 or Thomas Bauer 2011), yet the image of a “return to tradition” persists. The only partially correct aspect of this is that dogmatism, the rigid distinction between ‘truth’ and “heresy,” entered the world with monotheism (Assmann 2003)4 and that, in this sense, there is a long continuity. However, this history concerns capitalist ways of thinking as a whole and is therefore not suitable for distinguishing between supposed modern “openness” and religiously stubborn “tradition.”
Another argument in favor of the modernity of fundamentalism is that it also appears in the guise of religions that, historically, have no tradition of fanatical adherence to truth in the monotheistic sense, such as Hinduism and Buddhism in particular. The fact that the resources of these religions are now also being used to construct exclusionary collective identities (including pogroms, such as those against the Rohingya in Myanmar) can only be explained by the importation of these patterns in the wake of capitalist penetration of the societies in question. Traditional “folk Islam” was also monotheistic in name only. Just like medieval Catholicism, it was teeming with saints, spirits, and other elements of polytheism, as well as all kinds of spirituality and mysticism. It is precisely the supposedly pre-modern Taliban and other Islamist fanatics who are now doing everything in their power to brutally eradicate these traditions (especially Sufism) and impose “one truth,” just as capitalist socialization subjects the whole world to one principle.
7. Finally, the modern character of neo-religious fundamentalisms is evident in yet another respect. Like esoteric circles, they are extremely attractive to “meaning seekers” of all possible backgrounds who are looking for an identity to escape the suffering of an atomized existence. In this context, there is often talk of “converts.” However, this term already points to a fundamental misunderstanding; it suggests traditional religious affiliations that are changed through proselytizing and conversions. In fact, however, these are isolated individuals who have often switched back and forth between a wide variety of modern identity offerings until, for example, they have temporarily found a new identity home in some Islamist group. Even in so-called Islamic countries, it is often the most fanatical Islamists who have a secular or politically left-wing past; insofar as they refer to their origins, this clearly has a constructed character (Roy 2005).
We are therefore not dealing with an alternative between modern individualism and pre-modern collectivism, but with the poles of a pair of opposites that can merge at any time and take on all kinds of content. For example, there are also extremely collectivist esoteric sects whose members give themselves up so completely that they even commit collective suicide. Conversely, Islamism also knows the phenomenon of a multitude of splinter groups, all of which represent their own hand-knitted version of “Islam” and vehemently distinguish themselves from one another. As a rule, these groups have no idea about the sometimes very demanding theological disputes from the long history of Islam, nor are they interested in them. In this, too, they prove to be highly modern; it is the narcissistic megalomania of abstract individuals that leads them to believe that they can find direct access to an absolute “truth” without any major intellectual effort. It is also significant that Islamists, like esoteric circles, are extremely susceptible to rampant conspiracy ideologies.
8. The other major neo-religious movement, that of the evangelicals, is also in many ways taking over the legacy of the defunct and crisis-ridden secular religions. Its boom began with the failure of liberation nationalism in the capitalist periphery and the onset of the neoliberal era, which triggered a surge of crisis-ridden individualization. In Latin America and Africa in particular, people were torn away from their traditional living conditions, some of which were still intact, and “liberated” without, however, being given any real prospects as commodities and citizens. Under these conditions, evangelical sects, with their strange mixture of Protestant work ethic, intoxicating community experiences, superficially staged “miracles” in the style of cheap television shows, end-time visions, etc., present an attractive offer that in a twisted way reflects the reality of life for people who are condemned to fight for their survival every day under the most precarious conditions in a crisis-ridden capitalism. However, it should not be forgotten that “church communities” generally also fulfill social functions by supporting each other. Incidentally, this also applies to most Islamist groups, which also provide material and social support to their followers, thereby strengthening their loyalty.
In this respect, it can be said that neo-religious communities, regardless of their political persuasion, fill a void left by the absent state. Under capitalist conditions, a reasonably functioning state is indispensable for securing the general social cohesion that is constantly challenged by the centrifugal forces of competition and countless private interests. The process of decay of state institutions points to a fundamental crisis of the capitalist order, which has long since spread not only to the countries of the Global South, but also to the capitalist centers. In this situation, religious groups offer isolated individuals a sense of identity and (a certain) material support, but only in the form of fragmented group solidarity and clientelism; in this very way, they reflect the disintegration of commodity-based social cohesion and at the same time drive it further forward. The current boom in religious fundamentalism is therefore not a relapse into pre-modernity. It is both a symptom and a dynamic moment of a fundamental crisis of capitalist modernity, which is proving increasingly untenable.