The welfare state: under the wheels of market-liberal populism

Citizen’s income reform

[This article posted on July 1, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/24-2025/wie-der-sozialstaat-unter-die-rader-des-marktlibertaren-populismus-gerat/.]

CDU Secretary General Carsten Linnemann wants a “major citizen’s income reform” that goes “to the heart of the matter” – more precisely, to the foundations of the welfare state.

A study commissioned by the association Sanktionsfrei (Sanction-Free) has revealed, among other things, that 54 percent of parents who receive citizen’s income say they go without food so that their children have enough to eat.

When asked about this during a press conference recorded by Phoenix TV, CDU Secretary General Carsten Linnemann responded by saying that he did not want to comment on individual benefit rates – and therefore also not on the situation of those affected by poverty. Instead, he wanted to emphasize that he was striving for a “major citizen’s income reform,” one that, as he had said a few days earlier, would “get to the heart of the matter.”.

Apparently even more so than today. As Linnemann had previously stated, it should also be possible to completely eliminate citizen’s income. However, this has so far failed due to the Basic Law, or at least the interpretation of Article 20 of the Basic Law by the Federal Constitutional Court, which defines the Federal Republic of Germany as a “social federal state.”

First- and second-order solidarity

This reform is based on a peculiar interpretation of the concept of “solidarity” across society as a whole. On the one hand, solidarity with those “who, for whatever reason, cannot work.” On the other hand, solidarity between those affected by poverty and those currently in employment, whose tax contributions make the citizen’s income system possible in the first place.

Linnemann fails to mention the implied “solidarity” with those who earn capital income, who – with increased capital or, depending on the case, skimming rates – are hardly called upon to finance the welfare state anyway, and are thus spared, and this is intentional. This seems to be a matter of course to him. And to name it could raise uncomfortable questions.

This second dimension of solidarity – i.e., that at the bottom with those at the top and in the middle, which at least relativizes, if not completely neutralizes, the first, original dimension of solidarity – means that citizen’s income must be based on the principle that “those who can work must also go to work.” No matter what the conditions. At least under the conditions that the market currently offers.

Linnemann does not say this, of course, but he must mean it. And these conditions are not to be tampered with in any way. Linnemann’s CDU rejects an increase in the minimum wage, for example. And it also rejects a move away from exportism, which implies wage moderation, in favor of strengthening domestic demand, which would require the opposite.

Linnemann believes that he can rely on “millions of Germans” who do not consider the current system of basic social security to be ‘fair’ – because it is (still) too generous or perhaps fundamentally flawed – for his solidarity coup, which is ultimately intended to eliminate genuine solidarity. Admittedly, “a few million Germans” may only be a small minority among 72 million citizens. But in fact, this is how many of those who “have to go to work” – under the conditions they were able to secure – feel.

A survey conducted by MDR in 2023 found that 62 percent of respondents from Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, and Thuringia considered a proposed increase in basic income at the time to be too high. Moreover, 73 percent wanted “tougher sanctions.” One respondent said that an increase in basic income (or basic income itself?) was “a slap in the face for those who work for little money.”

Identifiable and unidentifiable authorities

Those who “have to go to work” (Linnemann) under the current conditions because they would otherwise have no income, and (as Linnemann points out) because the welfare state would not provide them with dignified support but would instead treat them in a degrading manner if they lost their source of income, which further increases the pressure, only address “the welfare state,” not the market. For only the latter is tangible as a nameable entity: there are politicians, parties, and political commentators who vote for or against the establishment of a dignified welfare state, which, depending on the majority, leads to its expansion or dismantling.

They do not address the conditions that force them to accept their jobs—in some cases for “little money.” Nor do they address the market conditions that have turned those affected into welfare recipients. For in the competitive market, these conditions are ultimately not personally identifiable as “masterless slavery” (Max Weber).

There are the many unknown buyers who are no longer buying or will soon be unable to buy (latent competition). There are the known competitors, or those who appear out of nowhere, previously unknown, from the same industry or from completely different industries (if the industry as a whole is shrinking), to whom customers are migrating. Without knowing who “the competitors” actually are. Their management, their employees, their frequently changing investors? Their suppliers, who deliver inexpensive and high-quality intermediate products, and then these three groups again. All this in a highly complex field of long, difficult-to-overview supply chains?

The lack of authority and addressees in the market nexus, which is created by the “invisible” (Smith) or “hidden hand” (Bhagwati) of competition, means that responsibility (for falling or lost income, or even for the stress of preventing this) is converted into “personal responsibility.” And many people think: “Nobody helps me either. Why are these lazy bums getting help? It’s unfair.” When they feel anger about the prevailing economic conditions, it is “anger without a target.”[1] Or, of course, anger at scapegoats they think they have identified: foreigners, woke people.

It wasn’t always the case that people like Linnemann could get away with his refusal to show solidarity disguised as solidarity. Until recently, I believe there was still solidarity among those in active employment with those who had fallen out of the system. This included high earners as well as those at the lower end of the wage scale. (This is confirmed by the Politbarometer, which recorded a rejection rate of 66 percent for cuts in basic social security in 2010, compared to an approval rate of 64 percent in 2023.)

And perhaps there was also a basic understanding that an adequate “reservation wage” provided by social security networks has a positive influence on the wage share and reduces income disparities. And that a falling reservation wage has the opposite effect, because the fear of falling increases and bargaining power decreases. This is generally welcomed by neoclassical economists because it prevents “the risk of unemployment from losing much of its terror.”[2] This must be avoided so that the pressure to increase “efficiency” (for whom?) does not let up.

Education for market obedience

However, the market nexus apparently acts relentlessly as an educational institution, something that market libertarians such as Hayek and his followers have always celebrated. It educates people to be “market-obedient” (Nell-Breuning) and, above all, to interpret the market as an expression of “freedom” and the democratic, egalitarian constitutional state as a force that undermines freedom. In its socio-political dimension, which aims to dampen market pressure – in an inevitably particularistic manner, incidentally – it appears to the new market populists, who see their heroes in the Linnemanns, Musks, Thiels, and Mileis of this world, as nothing more than a discriminatory, i.e., injustice-producing force.

In this way, the new market populism ensures that we will never be able to escape the “steel shell” (Max Weber) of the continued economization of all aspects of life – “until the last hundredweight of fossil fuel has burned up,” as Max Weber noted over a hundred years ago. And so many petty bourgeois, succumbing to the apparently irresistible appeal of market populism, are contributing to the “shutdown” of the “redistributive-protectionist” “social democracy”[3] that is, after all, primarily intended for them.

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[1] See Sauer, D., et al. (2018) Rechtspopulismus und Gewerkschaften. Eine arbeitsweltliche Spurensuche (Right-wing populism and trade unions. A search for clues in the world of work), Hamburg, p. 13 f., 89 ff.

[2] Blanchard, O./Illing, G.: Makroökonomie (Macroeconomics), 6th edition, Munich 2014, p. 235.

[3] Streeck, W.: Zwischen Globalismus und Demokratie. Politische Ökonomie im ausgehenden Neoliberalismus (Between Globalism and Democracy: Political Economy in the Twilight of Neoliberalism), Frankfurt am Main 2021, p. 27, 31f., 38-41.

Ulrich Thielemann, economist and business ethicist, is director of MeM – Think Tank for Business Ethics (Berlin), founded in 2010. He has been a private lecturer at the University of St. Gallen since 2010. From 2001 to 2010, he was deputy director of the Institute for Business Ethics at the University of St. Gallen.

Competition as a concept of justice.

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Poor against poorer

By the editorial team

[This editorial posted on July 3, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/24-2025/arm-gegen-armer/.]

Dear readers

The divide between rich and poor has been growing for years. While in 2021 there were still a good 34,000 millionaires with an average income of three million euros in Germany, according to our author Werner Vontobel there are now around 40,000. In terms of income, there are 135 poor people for every one of them.

Paradoxically, current discussions hardly address this social imbalance. Leading politicians are more known for turning the tables, as is CDU Secretary General Carsten Linnemann. He calls for solidarity between those affected by poverty and the workers whose tax contributions make the citizen’s income system possible in the first place.

This idea is not only factually incorrect in a currency-issuing state, where citizens must first receive the currency in order to pay taxes. It also undermines the “original dimension” of solidarity, according to economic ethicist Ulrich Thielemann, which – one might add – is directed from the top down and not the other way around.

If solidarity with the “hard-working population” is important to Linnemann and Co., one would think that a poverty-proof minimum wage would be an important concern for them. Although the CDU/CSU and SPD still stated in their coalition agreement that “the minimum wage commission would be guided by both wage developments and 60 percent of the gross median wage of full-time employees,” making a “minimum wage of 15 euros in 2026” achievable, the government is falling short of this goal. From 2026, the minimum wage will be only 13.90 euros.

This continues a pattern of past failures. As MAKROSKOP editor Lukas Poths notes, based on calculations by the Economic and Social Science Institute (WSI), the minimum wage has always been below the 60 percent threshold required not only by the coalition agreement but also by the EU directive on adequate minimum wages. Furthermore, the minimum wage fell behind the development of collectively agreed wages until 2022.

The government is therefore already practicing breaking promises at an early stage, backed by an ideology that pits the poor against the even poorer. The SPD’s precarious poll ratings come as no surprise. What has become of the social democratic conscience to which its members of parliament are committed?

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Warlike – but unreasonable?

By Markus Knauff

[This article posted on July 15, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/26-2025/kriegstuchtig-aber-unvernunftig/.]

Our thinking about war and armament is distorted. How can we counteract this? A plea for more collective reason.

The war in Ukraine is putting our clear thinking to the test. We must protect ourselves against increasing threats with ever more weapons and deterrence. That sounds reasonable – but is it?

What seems rational to us is often riddled with errors in reasoning and cognitive biases. What was considered taboo yesterday is now political normality. First, helmets were delivered to Ukraine, then cannons, then tanks – now cruise missiles and long-range rockets are being discussed. And a Green Party member of parliament wore a leopard-print sweater to the Bundestag session where the decision on the delivery of Leopard tanks was made. Who actually noticed that the Greens have long since ceased to be a left-wing party, let alone a peace party?

Psychology refers to this as shifting baseline bias: we often fail to notice changes that occur in small steps. Our understanding of a “normal” state gradually changes because we only use the current state as a benchmark for comparison – not previous or original states. The result: no action is taken when intervention is necessary.

Our language is also becoming increasingly distorted: words such as “warlike,” “enemy,” and “front” have not only found their way into talk shows and party manifestos—they are also changing our cognitive networks. US cognitive scientist George Lakoff explains how language influences thinking in his framing theory: When you say “victory,” “enemy,” or “warfare,” you activate certain neural networks and suppress others—such as those associated with ‘understanding’ or “compromise.” The militarization of language leads to the militarization of thought. Those who become accustomed to it will eventually forget that war means death and suffering above all else.

Groupthink bias also plays a role here. Members of a group suppress dissenting opinions and critical thinking in order to avoid conflict and not jeopardize unity. The group believes it cannot make mistakes, warnings and counterarguments are dismissed, and critics or opponents are devalued. The group soon believes in its moral superiority—often at the expense of realistic assessments, ethical standards, or alternative solutions. Especially when a group feels threatened from outside, it becomes more susceptible to this type of group pressure.

This is rarely as evident as in the media and political discourse on the war in Ukraine. Differentiated voices that point to the escalatory logic of arms deliveries are quickly discredited as naive, dangerous, or even disloyal. Instead of critical debate, a morally charged consensus dominates, treating any questioning as a breach of taboo. The result is collective self-affirmation through the widespread exclusion of dissent.

What is lost sight of, for example, is who profits from the war. Rheinmetall is posting record profits. Anyone who bought a share in the arms giant five years ago for around €80 now holds a stock worth around €1,700—a twentyfold increase in five years. Yet economists describe weapons as economically unproductive. They create no long-term added value; they just stand around and need to be maintained. Economist Thomas Piketty has therefore long called for democratic control of security-related industries.

Nationalizing the arms industry would be one option. If we believe that rearmament is necessary, why shouldn’t the state take over the production of weapons and armaments itself? That would send a clear moral signal: the production of weapons should serve national security interests, not the financial interests of entrepreneurs. It would also reduce the economic incentive for wars.

Of course, nothing is happening politically in this direction. The investment company BlackRock is the largest single shareholder in Rheinmetall, with around 5 percent of the shares—the very company where Chancellor Merz sat on the supervisory board of the German subsidiary. And in a talk show, Foreign Minister Johann Wadephuhl recently saw nothing wrong with German corporations doing good business with wars. Collective repression works perfectly: those who believe they are acting in the service of a good cause accept that morally questionable things will happen in the process.

Another psychological question is lost sight of: Who is actually supposed to fight? Defense Minister Pistorius speaks of over 460,000 soldiers that Germany would have to mobilize in an emergency. But who are these people? Are the younger generation in this country really prepared to risk their lives for a country that many are disappointed in anyway?

Much of our culture teaches young people to pursue their individual interests first and foremost. Even in their professional lives, many demand more work-life balance – and nowhere is there less of that than in war. Those who feel abandoned in times of crisis, who have to fight for opportunities in education and housing, ask themselves: Why fight for a system that does little for me otherwise? Yes, propaganda, peer pressure, and nationalist rhetoric can whip people into a war frenzy—history provides ample evidence of this. But these mechanisms no longer work so easily today.

And when they do, it is once again the economically weak who are hit hardest. In his analysis of modern wars, sociologist Michael Mann describes how elites often engage in ideological mobilization, while the social burden of war falls on disadvantaged groups. Studies on draft inequality also show that conscripts are disproportionately drawn from economically weaker social classes. It is not the children from affluent neighborhoods who are the first to go to the front. In wars, it is those who are already worst off who suffer the most—and who are least able to defend themselves. The same is already true in the war in Ukraine: the rich supply the weapons, the poor supply the bodies.

Of course, it is difficult to think rationally, especially in times of crisis. People often develop tunnel vision. Psychology calls this “motivated reasoning”: we tend to draw conclusions that fit our desires, hopes, or ideological beliefs. We overvalue information that reinforces our opinions, while devaluing other opinions and counterarguments.

A number of other cognitive biases also play a role here: The notorious confirmation bias describes the tendency to select and evaluate information in such a way that it supports existing beliefs – even when evidence to the contrary is available. The negativity bias causes us to overestimate negative news because it is potentially threatening. The availability bias ensures that particularly memorable or media-present events dominate our judgment. And the Dunning-Kruger effect: the less expertise people have, the more they overestimate their own competence.

The best remedy for such errors in thinking is critical reflection and a willingness to be self-critical. Especially in times of crisis and conflict, we should ask ourselves: What do I really know about the current situation? What information do I have, where does it come from, and how could I be manipulated? Are there other perspectives that I haven’t considered? Don’t people who hold different views also have good reasons for their opinions? What has become the new normal – and should it really be?

Psychology calls this metacognitive thinking – thinking about your own thinking. Studies show that people who are aware of their cognitive processes generally make better decisions and are less prone to errors in reasoning, cognitive biases, and hasty judgments. This activates circuits in the brain that monitor our thinking and steer it in a more rational direction.

This does not make anyone a “Putin sympathizer” or a “naive pacifist.” On the contrary, metacognitive thinking enables us to assess risks and options for action rationally and responsibly – especially when it is difficult to do so. The NATO countries have just decided to invest five percent of their gross domestic product in defense in the future. Opinions may differ on this, but there is one question we should all ask ourselves: Do we really need more weapons – or more rational thinking?

Markus Knauff holds the Chair of General Psychology and Cognitive Science at Justus Liebig University in Giessen. His research focuses on human rationality, in particular rational thinking and decision-making.

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Without a middle ground, the whole thing falls apart – Why Germany needs to reorganize its integration policy

Integration

By Sebastian Müller

[This article posted on July 15, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/26-2025/ohne-mitte-zerfallt-das-ganze-warum-deutschland-seine-integrationspolitik-neu-ord/.]

The Federal Republic of Germany was late in addressing the consequences of migration. Too late? What we can learn from Singapore and Denmark.

One of the great illusions of our time is that multi-ethnic societies can coexist harmoniously in the long term – without institutional control, without clear expectations, without social cohesion. Germany has long cherished this illusion. The result is clear to see: in many cities, milieus are emerging in which neither the Basic Law as a common framework nor the German language as a unifying bond nor a sense of belonging are taken for granted.

What is often romanticized in public debate as “diversity” is in reality often simply the consolidation of parallel cultural worlds—with their own norms, their own loyalties, and in some cases their own legal systems. The state is withdrawing where it is needed. The social and cultural glue is dissolving.

A comparison with Singapore and Denmark shows that integration cannot be achieved through appeals for tolerance, but only through political action, clear rules, and obligations. Germany needs a new, orderly integration policy—or it will disintegrate into sociocultural fragments whose only bond is bureaucracy.

We won’t “make it” this way

The Federal Republic was slow to recognize itself as a country of immigration – and even slower to address the consequences. Instead of a clear normative framework, it opted for liberal multiculturalism, which treated culture as a private matter and declared integration to be the responsibility of the host society. Expectations of immigrants are low, government control mechanisms are weak, and trust in self-regulation, social workers, and volunteers is high.

This attitude has come back to haunt us since the refugee crisis of 2015, if not before. Today, many neighborhoods are home to culturally closed communities where German is hardly spoken, fundamental freedoms (especially for women) are not exercised, and loyalty to the constitution is hardly formal, let alone genuine. The police, schools, and judiciary regularly come up against limits that the liberal integration model cannot even name. Ten years later, virtually no one believes Angela Merkel’s rallying cry, “We can do it.”

Singapore: Mixing with order

The example of Singapore shows the challenges that immigration and ethnic diversity create for a community. The rigid control of ethnicity and religion by the city-state, which was only founded in 1965, has its origins in the violent riots that the former free port of the British East India Company had to endure in the course of decolonization.

In 1950, serious riots broke out between Malay Muslims and Catholic Eurasians, leaving 18 dead and 173 injured. In 1964, after a brief annexation to the Malayan Federation, the conflict between Malays and Chinese escalated, leaving 36 dead and over 500 injured. These were not mere street battles, but expressions of existential fear – the Chinese feared Islamization by a Malay majority, while the Malays feared the economic dominance of the Chinese population.

Today, Singapore takes care to ensure that the “mix” of Chinese, Malay, and Indian population groups does not shift in favor of or at the expense of any one ethnic group. This applies not only to the percentage of the total population, in which Chinese make up the majority at 74 percent, but also to religious affiliation. The state keeps a close eye on fundamentalist movements to prevent them from spreading. Missionary activities and publications that could disrupt “religious harmony” are prohibited by law. Muslim women are not allowed to wear headscarves in the country’s public schools.

The Employment Pass, in its various forms, controls immigration not only on the basis of demographic factors, but also on economic considerations. If the economy is performing poorly in a particular sector, fewer foreigners are admitted. Conversely, the number of work permits for migrants is increased in certain sectors during boom phases.

However, the central element of integration policy, the “pillar of the nation,” is public housing with its ethnically mixed residential neighborhoods. Around 80 percent of Singaporeans live in state-subsidized housing. The so-called Ethnic Integration Policy stipulates which buildings citizens who are eligible to buy and sell state-owned housing may live in.

Schools are required to teach common values, and political communication is consistently geared toward maintaining social unity. New arrivals are to be integrated in such a way that, over time, they become Singaporeans “in their outlook and identity.”

The result: there are no ethnic ghettos, political stability is high, and intercultural conflicts remain marginal. Singapore does not engage in identity politics—it manages diversity as a reality, but subjects it to a common national framework. Critics see this practice as authoritarian. In fact, it is an example of successful constitutional integration: cultural heterogeneity is embraced, but not at the expense of the whole.

Conversely, Singapore’s extensive efforts show how fragile an ethnically heterogeneous society is without a consciously guided, institutionally secured, and nationally embedded integration policy. “I am under no illusion that our ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious differences will disappear,” warned Singapore’s founding father Lee Kuan Yew in 2011.

Denmark: Integration through self-assertion

But even formerly ethnically homogeneous societies can change and destabilize within a very short time as a result of uncontrolled migration. For centuries, Denmark was a relatively culturally closed society with a uniform language, religion, and legal culture. Modern immigration began relatively late, with guest workers in the 1970s and a strong influx from Muslim countries since the 1990s.

The long-dominant Scandinavian model of an open welfare state came under pressure when it became increasingly clear that parts of the immigrant groups – especially those from Muslim-influenced countries – were not meeting expectations for linguistic, cultural, and normative integration. The consensus that integration would automatically succeed through government programs crumbled.

Once it was recognized that state tolerance was often interpreted as weakness, the liberal integration model also came to an end. Since 2015 at the latest, Denmark has begun to counteract this with a stricter integration and migration policy: strict immigration limits, compulsory language learning, compulsory preschool, tougher laws, measures against parallel societies, a ban on religious symbols in certain areas and – similar to Singapore – quota regulations for residential neighborhoods.

Unlike Singapore, Denmark aims to assimilate immigrants into the Danish majority society. What the small country fears most is increased social polarization of society, as in the US: ethnic and socioeconomic enclaves – ghettos on the one hand, gated communities on the other.

While strategies for residential integration are largely absent in Germany due to the disapproval of state restrictions, the Danish “ghetto law” stipulates that no more than 30 percent of “non-Western foreigners” may live in problem neighborhoods with high unemployment and crime rates. If a neighborhood is on the list of problem areas for five years in a row, the government even reserves the right to demolish social housing and resettle residents.

Parents are required to send their children to kindergarten from their first birthday for the sake of integration. Those who refuse have their social welfare benefits cut. And residence permits can be revoked in the event of misconduct. Since 2018, there has also been a ban on face coverings. Since then, no one has been allowed to cover their face with a burqa or niqab

. The measures are controversial, but in Denmark they are supported by a cross-party consensus – and they are having an effect. Denmark responded early to the first signs of a loss of control and social tensions after 2015 with a clear change of course. Those who want to stay must integrate into a society that is not prepared to compromise its self-image and its welfare state. Rights do not come without responsibilities.

Germany: Between utopia and self-denial

It’s not that Germany, with over 80 million inhabitants and its own culture and history, could copy the Singaporean or Danish model one-to-one. It’s just that Germany doesn’t have its own model. Its integration policy is characterized by contradictions, illusions, naivety, and a normative vacuum.

No community without cultural anchors

The fact that the German state is bound by the constitutional principle of neutrality does not mean that it is merely an administrator of “diversity.” There needs to be a clear commitment to one’s own political order, to the German language, and to the social rules of coexistence. This does not mean cultural egalitarianism—but it does mean that the community cannot be culturally indifferent if it wants to survive.

The idea that integration can be achieved through “dialogue” or “negotiation processes” is naive. It is achieved through commitment, through shared institutions, through active public engagement. We need schools that impart not only knowledge but also guidance. We need an administration that does not look away. And we need a society that is prepared to defend its order even against those who reject or ignore it.

If it is not to remain an empty phrase divorced from reality, the much-vaunted “diversity” is dependent on certain conditions, above all a common political culture. Singapore achieves this through government technology, Denmark through toughness and commitment. Germany would have to achieve it through conviction, pacing, clearly communicated requirements and, ultimately, the prospect of belonging beyond mere legal norms.

A community is more than an economic area with social transfers. It is a collective project that requires common rules, language, institutions, and obligations. Integration must not be a non-binding offer. It is a necessity—without which the state will eventually become a spectator of its own dissolution.

Sebastian Müller studied history, political science, and German language and literature. As an author, he focuses on the interactions between economics and society as well as economic history. He has been an editor at MAKROSKOP since 2016.

The dawn of neoliberalism.

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Is Trump jeopardizing our drug supply?

Health

By Hartmut Reiners

[This article posted on July 15, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/26-2025/gefahrdet-trump-unsere-arzneimittelversorgung/.]

Donald Trump wants to force the US pharmaceutical industry to offer its drugs in the US at the lowest price they charge in other countries. Will we soon face drug prices as high as those in the US?

The price of drugs in the US is three times higher than in OECD countries. Donald Trump wants to force European manufacturers to sell their products in the US at the prices charged in Europe. According to Trump, this would “almost immediately” result in Americans getting these drugs 80 percent cheaper than before.

As is usual with Trump, this is an unkeepable promise, but the Berliner Zeitung senses danger and runs the headline: “Will we soon have to pay as much for medicines as in the US?” It refers to voices from the German pharmaceutical industry who welcome Trump’s measure. Dorothee Brakmann, CEO of the umbrella organization Pharma Deutschland, claims that there are “low prices” in Germany that have led to disruptions in the supply of medicines. Thomas Preis, president of the pharmacists’ association ABDA, strikes the same note. There is a danger, he says, “that the global bottlenecks that already exist will become even more acute.”

This is a smokescreen and half-truths are being spread with the aim of watering down the regulation of drug prices in Germany. Unfortunately, the Berliner Zeitung failed to go into more detail about the mechanisms of the German drug market. But that would have spoiled its story about a threat to our drug supply coming from the US.

For 40 years, politicians have tried to limit the market power of the pharmaceutical industry with a differentiated set of instruments. They were initially successful, but the big corporations always responded with new business models that secured huge profits for them.

Fixed prices and discount agreements

Until the end of the 1980s, there were no significant regulations on drug prices in Germany, only a list of minor drugs and preparations with questionable efficacy that were not covered by statutory health insurance (GKV). Otherwise, manufacturers were paid the price they demanded for all prescribed preparations. With the Federal Association of the Pharmaceutical Industry (BPI), they had a powerful lobby that wielded considerable influence in the Bundestag, especially in the FDP.

In the 1980s, CDU Social Affairs Minister Norbert Blüm was the first influential politician to dare to take her on. To finance his planned introduction of social nursing care insurance, he introduced a fixed-price system for drugs with the same active ingredients or the same efficacy, which reduced drug costs. Average prices for the various fixed-price groups serve as benchmarks. If the price of a drug in this group exceeds this amount, insured persons must pay the difference.

The fixed-price system not only transformed the drug market, but also shook up the pharmaceutical industry in Germany. For the first time, manufacturers had to think about their own profitability. Behind the scenes, leading representatives of the major pharmaceutical companies admitted that the fixed amounts had set sensible standards for effectiveness and efficiency in the pharmaceutical industry and had led to a long-overdue market shake-up. Big Pharma founded its own interest group, the Association of Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies (VfA), which is independent of the BPI.

In 2003, health insurance companies were given another tool to control drug spending in the form of discount agreements, which were expanded in the following years. The Wido Drug Index shows that, measured by the number of daily doses prescribed at the expense of the statutory health insurance system (DDD), 93.5 percent of drugs are non-patent-protected preparations. Generic drugs are still profitable, but not nearly as much as patent-protected preparations.

The fixed-price systems introduced in other European countries have intensified price competition in the generic drug market and led to a global concentration of active ingredient manufacturers. In this respect, the warning issued by ABDA President Reis about a shortage of active ingredients caused by oligopolies is justified. However, this problem has nothing to do with Trump’s complaints about US imports of European drugs.

Active ingredients that are important for basic care, such as amoxicillin (respiratory tract), ibuprofen (painkillers), metformin (diabetes), and ramipril (high blood pressure), are now only offered by two or three manufacturers—mostly from China or India—which has led to shortages of standard medications throughout Europe. This problem cannot be solved with national health policy instruments, but only at the EU level with appropriate stockpiling and market control.

Strategies of Big Pharma

Global pharmaceutical companies such as Novartis, Pfizer, Sanofi, and GSK, as well as major German manufacturers such as Boehringer, Bayer, and Merck, have long since lost interest in the generics market. They have sold these product lines or floated them on the stock exchange as separate companies. Their business model has focused on the development of new active ingredients, particularly in oncology and neurology, as well as in the rare disease sector (“orphan drugs”).

This is where the real money is to be made. Measured by the number of daily doses (DDD) of drugs prescribed, non-patented drugs accounted for 93.5 percent of the total in 2021, while patented drugs accounted for only 6.5 percent, but these accounted for almost half of the statutory health insurance drug expenditures.

Pharmaceutical manufacturers initially responded to the introduction of fixed prices and discount agreements with a simple trick. They attempted to circumvent the fixed price regulations with pseudo-innovations (“me-too” preparations) that only offered new molecular variations but no additional benefits. Ironically, it was Health Minister Daniel Bahr, a member of the FDP party and considered a friend of Big Pharma, who put a stop to such fakes. But even he felt that the pharmaceutical industry’s dubious product policy had gone too far.

The Pharmaceutical Market Restructuring Act (AMNOG), which came into force in 2011, introduced a benefit assessment for new patented active ingredients. If these have no additional therapeutic or economic benefit over existing preparations in the same indication area, they are assigned to the fixed-price sector. This is decided by the Joint Federal Committee (G-BA) with the support of an institute subordinate to it (IQWiG). The G-BA has the task of specifying the principle, which is only formulated in general terms in Social Code V, that the statutory health insurance system only pays for services with proven medical evidence. It is therefore also known as the “little legislator.”

The most important innovation of the AMNOG was the introduction of price negotiations between manufacturers and the statutory health insurance system in the area of patented drugs, the results of which also apply to private health insurance. If the G-BA confirms that new preparations offer additional benefits over existing drugs, the GKV-Spitzenverband enters into price negotiations with the manufacturers, which must be concluded after one year. If the two sides cannot agree, an arbitration board decides.

This procedure, which has been standard practice in other EU countries for some time, was a step forward, but did not result in any significant reductions in expenditure for the GKV. There are several reasons for this, which cannot be detailed here. The core problem is the rule that in the first year after a new drug is approved, the market entry price set by the manufacturer applies, which is based on their interests and expectations.

Huge profits with few therapeutic areas

By focusing on new and profitable drug therapies, large corporations are enjoying great success, as the WIdO drug index shows: Since 2011, the average package price for finished drugs has increased only slightly, mainly due to the generic drug market and discount agreements. In contrast, the average price of patented drugs, which account for only about 6 percent of prescribed drugs, rose from around 2,500 to just under 15,000 euros between 2018 and 2022 alone. The prices for newly introduced patented drugs have experienced a veritable price explosion, rising from an average of around 5,000 euros to around 50,000 euros.

Orphan drugs play a special role here. In this area, the cost of treatment per case can run into seven figures. The benefit assessment instrument introduced with the AMNOG is fundamentally flawed in this area because the number of cases is too small. Furthermore, the therapies have different effects in each individual case, and it is not known why this is so. These problems can only be addressed by sharing the risk between manufacturers and payers. However, this would require pharmaceutical companies to disclose their cost structures and research strategies, which they are not prepared to do.

Outlook

The pharmaceutical market for patented drugs has turned into a global rat race. The first manufacturer to launch a new drug with a patented active ingredient in certain therapeutic areas enjoys a lucrative bonanza until the patent expires, usually after 20 years, while its competitors write off their corresponding investments or transfer them to the development costs for other patented drugs. This is also one of the reasons for the enormous price increases in this segment of the pharmaceutical market.

Pharmaceutical companies are investing less in their own research and more in start-ups they finance and in mutually lucrative cooperation with university hospitals and their subsidiaries. A spectacular example of this strategy is the cooperation between the research company Biontec, which is affiliated with the University of Mainz, and the US pharmaceutical giant Pfizer in the development of a COVID-19 vaccine.

The growing dependence of academic research on the pharmaceutical industry is a problem that is virtually impossible to solve at the national level. This will not change as long as the US healthcare system continues to pursue a largely unregulated pricing policy and Europe cannot agree on a common strategy for controlling the pharmaceutical market.

However, the danger conjured up by the Berliner Zeitung that American conditions threaten us on the drug market is a baseless scenario. Trump’s measures against drug imports from Europe are only superficially directed against the European pharmaceutical industry.

His supporters in the lower and middle classes are suffering from high drug prices in the US.

They do not have adequate health insurance, especially in the Bible Belt states. This is one of the reasons for the enormously high consumption of painkillers in the US, which has reached epidemic proportions. Trump’s announcement that he will punish European drug exporters is a political placebo for MAGA fans and does not pose a threat to the supply of drugs in Europe, as the Berliner Zeitung fears.

No German government in its right mind would consider raising drug prices just to secure our pharmaceutical industry’s exports to the US.

Hartmut Reiners is an economist, health economist, and freelance journalist. He worked for many years in state health ministries. In addition to numerous articles, he has published books on the healthcare system.

The economic rationale of solidarity.

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“The shareholder has become common property”

The blind spots of democracy

By Sebastian Müller

[This article posted on February 13, 2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/05-2024/der-shareholder-ist-zum-gemeingut-geworden/.]

We need institutions that do justice to us as human beings, says Armin Groh. This also includes democratizing the economy. A conversation about his book “The Blind Spots of Democracy.”

The word “democracy” has always held great promise: freedom, human rights, co-determination, justice, prosperity, and peace are supposed to come with it. But its luster has faded, writes author and educator Armin Groh in his book “Die blinden Flecken der Demokratie” (The Blind Spots of Democracy), published by Edition MAKROSKOP. Western societies are divided, authoritarianism is on the rise, social inequality is increasing, and trust in political institutions has dwindled. MAKROSKOP editor Sebastian Müller spoke with him.

Mr. Groh, when you started writing Die blinden Flecken der Demokratie, who was your target audience?

Most school leavers, who have only a very vague idea of what our political parties stand for and are therefore hardly in a position to make a responsible voting decision. And the 40 percent of German citizens who can’t remember what they voted for last time.

The book reads like a novel and is written from the perspective of a child, Lukas. Lukas is friends with a boy who is his neighbor but comes from a different, far less privileged world than Lukas himself. Do you find memories from your own childhood in the book?

In my elementary school in Stuttgart, there were children from all income groups. The school was located between a poorer neighborhood with a high proportion of immigrants and the Hasenberg, where there are mansions. As I mention in my book, there were actually attempts by the wealthier parents to get their children into a certain class. But I didn’t notice the differences in wealth at the time. It was all about courage, quick wit, and athleticism. It was only much later that I experienced firsthand in my personal environment what it means to fall through the cracks of Germany’s meritocracy.

Did you ever work as a temporary worker before becoming a teacher?

No, only as a temporary worker. To finance my studies, I often worked on assembly lines in metalworking companies. That’s probably why I chose such a company for my book. But temporary workers were the exception back then. To paint a realistic picture, I had to do some research, and a friend who is an industrial mechanic helped me.

The chapter “Economy and Democracy” also deals with co-determination in companies. This was a major issue for trade unions well into the 1970s. Their demands were accompanied by wild waves of strikes. The wage increases that were enforced fueled inflation during the oil price crisis. At the same time, it was also the era of anti-authoritarian revolt.

Even during the Weimar Republic, trade unions demanded not only co-determination but also comprehensive democratization of the economy. This concern is much older than the 1968 movement and its anti-authoritarian ideas. The 1968 movement was not least a reaction to fascism, colonialism, and racism and sought alternatives against this backdrop. Although trade unions continue to advocate for more democracy in companies, this issue has indeed receded significantly in the public eye behind collective bargaining.

The blind spots of democracy

However, work discipline is also said to have declined in companies. There was talk of a “crisis of governability.” Had the trade unions not gone too far in this climate?

Demonstrations and strikes are a legitimate form of democratic decision-making. This does not mean that the desired reorganisation is characterised by arbitrariness. The protests of 1848 do not mean that unrest and indiscipline are characteristic of an established democracy. Democratic enterprises such as cooperatives are able to compete today, even in highly competitive industries. The accusation of a lack of “governability” is also linked to a problematic conception of society: that citizens must be governable from above. Yet it is a fundamental principle of democracy that the citizens themselves are sovereign. It is not legitimate to subject free and equal people to an authoritarian government. This is also a central idea of democratic companies. Why should it be any different at work, where we spend a large part of our lives? Liberals such as John Stuart Mill have also questioned this, and it is being discussed today by liberal philosophers under the heading of “workplace democracy.”

Are you familiar with the book “The Ungovernable Society” by Grégoire Chamayou?

I am familiar with some of his theses.

Chamayou presents a “history from above,” written from the perspective of entrepreneurs and politicians who wondered how they could regain control over these developments in the face of increasing indiscipline and strikes.

As I said: In the republican tradition of Rousseau and Kant, the core democratic idea is not to control the population from above; rather, the democratic sovereign must control the state apparatus and program it through legislation. Unfortunately, hierarchies tend to reinforce themselves. This is particularly evident in the reaction of companies and politicians to the 1968 movement and the trade unions. Their answer was “discipline through the market.” Chamayou calls this authoritarian liberalism, and indeed it weakened not only the beginnings of democracy in companies, but also democracy as a whole. Privatization, deregulation, and empty-coffers politics significantly restricted the scope for public decision-making.

In contrast, Ingar Solty, a researcher at the Institute for Social Analysis at the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation in Berlin, writes about the freedom to say “fuck you, boss.” Should that be a given in the modern workplace with its flat hierarchies?

Are you serious? If employees expect decency from their superiors and want to be treated like human beings, they should show decency themselves.

Physical and verbal violence only provide opportunities to denigrate democratic emancipation movements. Solty meant this metaphorically: Keynesian full employment policy had provided the material basis for feeling free, growing your hair long, showing up at work in jeans, and “letting the spirit run free.”

Wanting and expecting more from life than “9 to 5” jobs, alienating work routines, and the same job until the end of your life. Isn’t that also the message of your book?

This description gives the impression of a luxury trip—but in fact, the search for a different economy is about much more than that. It seems to me that Gabor Maté is quite right when he describes our culture and our way of doing business as traumatic. The performance mindset and radical individualism have a destructive effect on what we need most: connectedness and a sense of self-worth that does not depend on performance.

But isn’t performance necessary to a certain extent and also intrinsically desired by humans?

Activity or creativity are less loaded terms in this context. The economic concept of performance, on the other hand, is extremely problematic because it suggests that individual contributions to the common good can be quantified, which is not possible. As with a machine, it should be possible to determine what a person’s output is and what constitutes their value. This tears people out of their social context and reduces them to machines that become superfluous when their output is no longer adequate. The value of the output, in turn, is determined solely by its “use,” which is to be produced in an instrumental manner. However, a good life and meaning cannot be produced like a product. They have something intangible – like a musician who plays a melody most movingly when he is not aiming to do so, but is in resonance with something greater and has forgotten himself.

What does this mean for society?

This one-sided focus on “usefulness” is currently leading to a loss of meaning in our society. As Michael Sandel has emphasized, the prevailing performance culture threatens to tear our society apart. Traumatized individuals also tend to engage in socially destructive behavior, which can pass on the trauma to future generations. In addition, we naturally have a need for creative fulfillment, which is also thwarted by extreme economic rationalization. For our future, we should therefore think about institutions that do justice to us as human beings. This also includes democratizing the economy.

Prosperity and full employment also created the material basis for experimenting with drugs as a means of “finding oneself,” of living every day as if it were your last. It was the pursuit of great freedom. For those born after the war, it was a golden age. Today, one would say that this was precisely the beginning of the hyper-individualism you criticize. Was this perhaps also the seed of the decline of Keynesianism and collective organizations?

My book does not contain any nostalgia for the 1968 movement. Although, as I said, I believe it made an important contribution overall, I only mention it in passing. The desire for a democratic economy and full employment is much older and much more international. I see no direct link to hyperindividualism or drug use. Indigenous resistance to the economization of their communal economies is anything but hyperindividualistic. The world’s largest cooperative is Mondragon, which was founded in 1956 in the spirit of Catholic social teaching. The 1968 movement arose in a specific historical constellation of our modern age.

So where does hyperindividualism come from?

Indeed, hyperindividualism seems to me to be the cause of many of the problems of the present day, including our atomized economy. However, its deeper origins do not lie in the 1970s, but in the radically individualistic and mechanistic ideas of Thomas Hobbes, René Descartes, and others. As Hartmut Rosa recently argued, the pursuit of predictability and controllability in modernity has been accompanied by a tremendous loss of resonance. This loss of resonance also affects nature and the transcendent.

What do you mean by that?

If society, nature, and the universe consist only of ultimately dead, isolated substances, then connectedness to a higher meaning, to nature, and even to my neighbor is ultimately an illusion. I become a lone fighter in a world devoid of meaning. Authoritarian liberalism has significantly exacerbated this loss of resonance. While the 1968 generation was a singing movement, today we stare at Black Friday.

The protagonists of your book sympathize with economic democracy and cooperatively organized companies. You have already hinted that, in your opinion, this could be a model that could be applied across the board.

Unfortunately, the question we must ask ourselves today has become very modest: What arrangement of institutions gives humanity a chance to survive? Is there an arrangement that is less traumatic, less conflict-ridden, and less harmful to nature? The authoritarian liberalism of shareholders has become common property. It not only determines companies, but is also an influential factor in politics, both internally and externally. That is why it is particularly important in education to think about how we want to proceed in the future. Learners at high risk of a working life in precarious jobs have a right to discuss this.

Groh, Armin: Die blinden Flecken der Demokratie (The Blind Spots of Democracy). A journey of discovery into the history of political ideas. Promedia 2023. 264 pages.

The dawn of neoliberalism.

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Market economies: from rulers to tools?

By the editorial team of the Maroskop journal

[This article posted on May 29, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/19-2025/marktwirtschaften-vom-herrscher-zum-werkzeug/.]

Dear readers

Marx and Engels, Keynes and Polanyi – none of them achieved fame through their influential analyses of the market economy alone. They also had explicit political ambitions. In other words, they called for a more or less radical transformation of the market economy.

Our author Meinhard Creydt takes an in-depth look at the ideas of one of these pioneers: Karl Polanyi.

Starting from the observation that markets have developed a life of their own independent of society, the Hungarian economic historian advocates “embedding markets in social relations that transcend and superordinate them,” writes Creydt. According to Polanyi, markets would thus be transformed from “a master into a tool for our purposes.”

Dean Baker’s transformative idea for the financial sector is in line with Polanyi’s premise. Its purpose: to distribute money to companies and private individuals for real economic activities. For the US economist Baker, the financial sector should merely be an “intermediate product” and therefore kept “as small as possible.”

But what alternative forms of organization are conceivable for those companies whose liquidity is improved by the financial sector? Based on a critique of the primacy of the shareholder value approach (profit above all else), business administration professor Daniel Deimling envisions “new entrepreneurs” for whom profit becomes “one goal among others.”

Transformative ideas are therefore not only found in the classics of political economy; they are also present in the present day. And they can be linked together. This is a good thing, because what significance do social analysis and social criticism have without visions for change?

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The transformation of the market economy

Theory

By Meinhard Creydt

[This article posted on May 28, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/19-2025/die-transformation-der-marktwirtschaft/.]

For Karl Polanyi, the idea of a self-regulating market was “a blatant utopia.” He wanted to transform markets from “a ruler into a tool for our purposes.” An assessment.

Many people have all kinds of complaints about the market economy as it actually exists. At the same time, the vast majority of US citizens agree on at least one thing: there is no convincing alternative to the market economy as a model.

However, in recent decades, there have been increasing instances in the market economy that do not quite fit in with the economic liberalism and the prevailing image of it in economics. Some of these instances will be presented below as examples. Is their interaction transforming the market economy in qualitative terms?

Markets as the ideal means of coordination for anonymous and fleeting business relationships

According to classical economic doctrine, markets are characterized by the “general opening up of the potential field of interaction to an immense number of different exchange partners.”[1] Markets must be an “open, fluid field of constantly reversible and ad hoc initiated interactions.”[2] The influence of diffuse ties and personal loyalties would lead to a market-distorting network of cronyism.

However, companies are reluctant to change their business partners for small cost advantages. They value being able to rely on reliable business partners. The idea of the market as a producer of goods for unknown demand already has little to do with reality today. Many means of production, but also services for public consumption, require coordination agreements between clients and contractors. In some cases, there are long-term cooperation agreements between companies for joint product development and production planning. Manufacturers and suppliers in the automotive industry are mostly part of stable networks. For larger technical systems, there are public tendering procedures.

The economic relationships described by Ernest Mandel also differ from anonymous and fleeting contacts on markets:

“You don’t go to the supermarket to buy hydroelectric turbines for a dam; these are ordered with very precise specifications, down to the smallest detail. Even if this is done through a public tender, it is not the same as ‘allocation via the market’. The different cost estimates do not mean that different products are actually manufactured, from which a selection can then be made.”[3]

The unbearable lightness of the price mechanism

A theorist admired by staunch supporters of the market economy (especially in the FDP and AfD) is Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992). He sees a central advantage of the market in the performance of the price mechanism in assigning “every kind of scarce resource” a “numerical index” that “is not derived from any physical property that the individual thing possesses, but which reflects its significance in relation to the whole complex of means-end relationships or in which this is expressed.”[4]

Market participants then only need “to look at these quantitative indices (or ‘values’) containing all the relevant information whenever there is a small change.” The market contains a “system of remote communication that enables individual producers, simply by observing a few indicators, […] to adapt their activities to changes about which they need to know no more than what is reflected in price movements.”[5]

However, product line analyses, environmental and social balance sheets, environmental impact assessments, and technology assessment already exist today. They are part of an information infrastructure that highlights the qualitative effects and prerequisites of economic activities and offerings. Qualitative indicators can be developed on the basis of this information infrastructure. One example of this is MIPS (material intensity per service unit). In reality, therefore, “the flow of information is much richer than if it were conveyed solely through the price system.”[6] In a market economy, suppliers and consumers do not base their decisions solely on prices. Increasing attention to the difficulties of quantifying quality also calls into question the price medium.[7]

The ethical penetration of markets

According to classical economic theory, suppliers and customers in a market economy are guided by prices. They cannot deduce the reasons why certain products are cheap. For example, there are reasons why wages in the textile industry in Southeast Asia can be so low, but these reasons are of no concern to local buyers of clothing. At best, they are aware that wages are low. However, the reasons why this is the case, or why it is not, or not primarily, the responsibility of the population of the countries concerned, usually remain hidden. Local consumers often regard their own situation as their own achievement and conclude from the worse situation in other countries that the people living there are somehow “to blame.”

Karl Polanyi (1896-1964) rightly stated that the pure market economy, with its barriers of indifference between customers and suppliers, forms an “invisible boundary that isolates all individuals in their everyday activities as producers and consumers.” The market represents one of the most important “boundaries of moral development” because “under such conditions, people are not allowed to be good—even if they want to.”[8]

Classical economic ideas about the market economy see it as a self-regulating system that has and should have autonomy from other areas of society. According to sociologist Niko Stehr, maxims such as sustainability, fairness, and solidarity have become more important in consumer behavior in recent decades. Their product choices are increasingly not based solely on pure utility criteria. Of course, one must be able to afford a slightly more expensive but ethically less questionable product. Stehr sees customers with greater purchasing power as opinion leaders. Even discount supermarkets such as Aldi now offer organic products. The validity of the saying “first comes food, then morality” is declining.

Products whose low prices are due to poor working conditions and wages have increasingly come to public attention in recent decades. However, it is questionable to what extent the increased critical attention to supply chains remains within the narrow confines once described by Romano Prodi: “We have prevented the worst, but not the bad.” This is what happens when only the most extreme cases of child labor and dilapidated factory buildings (such as the Rana Plaza disaster in Bangladesh in 2013) are eliminated.

Professions

The relationship between workers or service providers who see themselves as professionals and their customers differs from other market relationships in that work content standards are particularly important. Of course, members of such professions want to earn money from their work, but at the same time, many of them want to meet the quality criteria established in their professional group.

There is often ongoing contact between professional providers and “customers.” In this contact, both sides provide feedback to each other. This includes feedback to customers on the extent to which their spontaneous needs demand products or services that fall below the usual standards. After all, a “professional” does not want to sell something to someone that falls short of their own standards. Customers, on the other hand, will not simply switch providers when problems arise and leave them in the dark as to why they are leaving. Instead, they can tell them (“voice”) if they see problems with the product or service and expect that this feedback will be addressed.

The importance of professional ethical standards in the professions and the corresponding regulation of the respective professional field can dampen private interests and reduce selfish behavior at the expense of others. In Hegel’s time, the professional association of a profession (not to be confused with traditional guilds), such as the chamber of physicians or the chamber of crafts, was called a corporation.

“Without being a member of a legitimate corporation (and only a community is legitimate as a corporation), the individual has no professional honor and is reduced by his isolation to the selfish pursuit of his trade […]. He will thus seek to achieve recognition through external displays of his success in his trade, displays which are unlimited because he does not live according to his status.”[9]

According to Adam Smith, all market actors achieve a higher overall result if each individual actor thinks only of his or her own private interest and does not orientate himself or herself towards the common good. This view is part of the canon of belief in the market economy. It is contradicted by the so-called fallacy of composition. The generalization of such actions, which are effective in individual cases when viewed in isolation, can have problematic effects. If everyone moves to the suburbs and builds a detached single-family home there, this leads to urban sprawl and a grotesque imbalance between heating costs and living space. Contrary to Adam Smith’s hope, the orientation of action toward general professional and ethical standards or even toward a society of good life[10] is about “rooting the particular in the general.”.[11]

Supply and demand

Another essential feature of liberal economic and macroeconomic theory of the market economy is that the market goods traded within it are bought and sold at prices determined exclusively by supply and demand. Based on this idea, social welfare regulations and the setting of a minimum wage must be considered alien to the market economy. The same applies to the linking of public contracts to certain social policy standards. For example, Hamburg’s public procurement law makes the award of public contracts dependent on whether the contracted companies adhere to collective agreements and tariff loyalty.

This represents at least a slight change from a fundamental flaw in the pure market economy. It has no “sensory organ” (Polanyi 2005, 84) to specify the moral and political goals or social standards of a society. Production is guided exclusively by the decisions of market actors as market actors and not as conscious political beings (Polanyi 2005, 83, 85).[12]

Markets are sensitive to the needs that individuals have as isolated individuals (Opel or VW?). Markets do not allow for collective demand that calls for overcoming the dominance of motorized private transport. Public goods, whose use is non-rivalrous and from which no one can be excluded, form another foreign body within the market economy. “Left to their own devices,” isolated individuals “will always tend to demand individual goods rather than collective services or facilities. […] There is therefore no spontaneous vote for the priorities and values of the ‘consumer society’ […]; there is only the powerlessness to define and advocate an alternative.”[13]

Markets are insensitive to the needs that individuals have when, as members of a society, they are guided by ideas about what public goods should look like—for example, a well-equipped public transport system for local and long-distance travel. Buyers’ decisions vary between individual offers. They cannot demand alternative overall conditions. “Choice in small matters does not guarantee choice in large matters.”[14]

Polanyi analyzes the division caused by the market economy between the particular interests of individuals as private owners (of money, capital, or their labor) and their needs as human beings who want a community of a certain quality. He sees this division as a fundamental obstacle to individual freedom: To act freely means “to act in the awareness that we are responsible for our share in the mutual relations of human beings—outside of which there is no social reality—and that we must bear this responsibility. Freedom here no longer means, as in the typical ideology of the citizen, being free from duty and responsibility, but being free through duty and responsibility.”

Freedom, Polanyi continues, is in this sense “not a form of detachment from society at all, but the basic form of social connectedness, not the point at which solidarity with others ends, but the point at which we take on the unavoidable responsibility of social existence.”[15]

Within the market economy, “the individual acts and weaves the illusion of his freedom.”[16] He imagines himself to be ‘free’ insofar as he feels independent of society. He feels “independent only because he is unaware of his dependencies.” Freedom remains self-deception as long as it is based on “ignorance” or “disregard” of responsibilities towards others.[17]

In accordance with this understanding of freedom, Polanyi advocates a regulation of the economy that is neither market-based nor state-socialist. For reasons of space, we cannot discuss here whether markets lose the advantages attributed to them when qualitative requirements or social “embeddedness” are imposed. We would at least like to refer to “industry and country studies” that “conclude that networks or associations play a more advantageous role in coordinating economic activities than the market (or the state).”.[18]

How the accumulation of non-market elements within the market economy is interpreted

A first faction sees non-market elements as the result of attacks on the market economy, which are due to ignorance of how it works. Market self-regulation is actually flawless, but in reality it does not work adequately because enemies of the market economy and people who misunderstand it constantly interfere with it or fail to recognize its importance.

Polanyi, on the other hand, “argued that the idea of a self-regulating market is a blatant utopia […]. Such an institution could not survive for long periods of time without destroying the human and natural substance of society.”[19] According to Polanyi, the pure market economy constantly provokes counter-movements. They advocate the protection of either the workforce or reasonably prosperous living conditions for the population and fight against capital to achieve this.

Historical examples show how capitalist enterprises, as beneficiaries of the market economy, were only prevented from ruining the conditions of their own existence by massive counterpressure. In the early 19th century, the military complained that recruits were becoming increasingly shorter. All kinds of struggles against the entrepreneurial class were necessary to prevent them from endangering the necessary labor force of the next generation through excessive child labor in pursuit of their short-term profit interests. Restrictions on working hours, state supervision of hygienic conditions in factories, and similar measures did not harm the progress of the market economy, but rather benefited it. Here, too, the following statement applies: under capitalist conditions, the owners of the commodity labor must reproduce themselves both with capital and against it.

A second view assumes that the non-market elements within the market economy remain below a threshold beyond which they would call the market economy as a whole into question. The quantity of these elements is, so to speak, too small to turn into a quality that is dangerous for the market economy. Alfred Müller-Armack already criticized “the practice of questioning the market economy character of economic policy by pointing out that it is not chemically pure. Experience has shown, however, that the market economy can tolerate a good deal of non-market measures without losing its essence; for example, the special regulations governing agriculture or transport have by no means disrupted the functioning of the market economy. As long as the basic process of the economy remains uniform, i.e., market-based, it is possible to tolerate other principles as well.”[20]

A third faction accepts the convergence and mutual reinforcement of non-market forces and hopes that this will lead to the increasing primacy of ethical maxims over market forces. Social systems can move away from the original gravitational field that holds them together and come under the pull of another field. Some see this process as automatic. Others regard the non-market elements outlined above as starting points within the market economy. The hope is that these will provide a basis for social movements that fight to establish the dominance of a different order over economic processes.

In the society advocated by Polanyi, the aim is to embed markets in social relations that transcend and supersede them. According to Polanyi, if this fundamental qualitative transformation does not succeed, ambitious social policies cannot coexist with the market economy. One of the two sides must prevail, otherwise they will paralyze each other.[21]

Markets do exist in the society that Polanyi considers desirable. However, he advocates an economy in which the prices of labor, land, and capital are not determined behind people’s backs by market mechanisms or the anonymous relationship between supply and demand, but rather by social consideration, consultation, and decision-making. For all other goods, markets retain the function of indicating shortages and customer demand. In this respect, markets cease to be the “ultimate decision-making authority” for society. They become “from a ruler to a tool for our purposes.”[22]

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[1] Geser, Hans 1983: Structural Forms and Functional Performance of Social Systems: A Sociological Paradigm. Opladen, 112

[2] Ibid., 113

[3] Mandel, Ernest n.d.: In Defense of the Socialist Planned Economy. n.p., 83 p. (German translation from New Left Review No. 150, 161, 169), 15

[4] Hayek, Friedrich August 1976: Individualism and Economic Order. Salzburg, 113

[5] Ibid., 115

[6] Pirker, Reinhard 2004: Markets as a Form of Social Regulation. Marburg, 81

[7] See Creydt, Meinhard 2024: Quality and Quantity. How can one-dimensional methods of calculation be replaced by multidimensional evaluation standards? In: Telepolis, April 13, 2024.

[8] Ibid., 268

[9] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Works. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer, Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt M. 1970, 395

[10] See Creydt, Meinhard 2017: The Poverty of Capitalist Wealth and the Good Life. Munich

[11] Hegel 7, 458f.

[12] Valderrama, Paula 2020: Democracy versus Market. Politics and Economics in Friedrich Hayek and Karl Polanyi. Marburg, 133

[13] Gorz, André 1967: On the Strategy of the Working Class in Neocapitalism. Frankfurt M., 119f.

[14] Elson, Diane 1990: Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market. In: Prokla, No. 78. Berlin, 75

[15] Polanyi, Karl 2005: The Great Transformation. Articles and Essays. Vol. 3, ed. by Michele Cangiani, Claus Thomasberger. Marburg, 147

[16] Ibid., 148

[17] Ibid., 272

[18] Pirker 2004, 36

[19] Polanyi, Karl 1978: The Great Transformation. Frankfurt M., 19f.

[20] Müller-Armack, Alfred 1974: Genealogy of the Social Market Economy. Bern, Stuttgart, 123

[21] cf. Polanyi 1978, 270, 314, 329

[22] Polanyi 2005, 128f.

Meinhard Creydt is a psychologist and holds a doctorate in sociology. He lives and works in Berlin. His most recent publications are the books “46 Questions on the Post-Capitalist Future” and “How Capitalism Can Become Unnecessary.”

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The election of Pope Leo confirms Francis’ radical reforms

The silent revolution

By Martin Gak

[This article posted on May 29, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/19-2025/die-wahl-papst-leos-bestatigt-franziskus-radikale-reformen/.]

Pope Francis was considered by many to be a reformer without impact – a misconception fueled by a lack of understanding of the complex architecture of the Vatican. The election of his successor Leo shows that his changes were more profound than his critics suspected.

The election of Pope Leo in just two days proves wrong all those who accused his predecessor Francis of inaction. The fact that the conclave made its choice so quickly and unanimously is no coincidence, but rather the result of political and institutional change: Francis fundamentally reformed the power structures of the Church.

One of the most significant changes is the abolition of papal secrecy – a legal and doctrinal upheaval designed to break through the culture of opacity in the Curia (“the body of […] authorities and institutions that assist the Pope in the exercise of his supreme pastoral office” – German Bishops’ Conference). Equally revolutionary was the overhaul of the Vatican’s financial systems, with stricter banking supervision and an unprecedented level of disclosure. Another historic move was the appointment of women to key positions in the Curia – a step that had been unthinkable until then.

But the most momentous change was probably the systematic renewal of the College of Cardinals – a targeted restructuring that can only be described as a purge. Of the 133 cardinals eligible to vote, 108 had been appointed by Francis himself. This also explains why he was able to largely ignore the attacks from traditionalist circles in the US, Australia, and Africa: he had already stripped them of their political power.

A formative friendship: the spiritual bridge between Francis and Leo

Before reaching the highest office in the Catholic Church, Jorge Mario Bergoglio and Robert Prevost – the secular names of the last and current popes – were bound by a friendship that went far beyond mere collaboration. Their relationship was marked by years of pastoral commitment and a shared dedication to reform – a bond based on personal trust and theological agreement.

Particularly in the Latin American context, where both spent their formative years, they developed a shared vision: a Church radically committed to justice, integration, and pastoral care. Bergoglio saw Prevost not as a vociferous revolutionary, but as a quiet yet unyielding reformer—a man who could navigate the institution with discretion and integrity without sacrificing its soul.

This deep connection paved the way for Prevost’s rise under Francis, who appointed him to key positions – most notably as head of the worldwide episcopate (bishopric). Their affinity was never merely ideological, but deeply personal, nourished by years of dialogue and working together.

Now that Prevost has ascended to the throne of St. Peter as Pope Leo XIV, it is clear that the continuity between the two pontificates is no coincidence or mere power play, but the logical consequence of a shared ecclesiastical vision that was often ahead of its time in Rome.

Pope Leo: A symbolic and political counterpoint

The election of Prevost – now Pope Leo – embodies this change like no other symbol. Born in the US, Leo later immigrated to Peru, where he became a naturalized citizen. His biography stands in sharp contrast to the anti-immigration policies of the Trump White House and its ideological allies.

He received his pastoral training in Latin America – the same theological and institutional school that shaped Francis. As an Augustinian, he is spiritually connected to the Jesuits and rooted in the tradition of liberation theology: a movement that is radically committed to justice, inclusion, and the poor.

His career is also a silent declaration of resistance to the ideology of the US right. His clear positions on Trump, the MAGA movement, and their migration policy are not only well known but programmatic—and make him a living antithesis of the Church.

Synodality as a way forward

Pope Leo has clearly signaled that he will not only preserve Francis’ legacy, but also deepen it. In his programmatic opening speech, he emphasized:

“Together, we must explore how we can be a truly missionary Church—a Church that builds bridges, seeks dialogue, and welcomes with open arms, like this square here. Everyone—truly everyone—should experience our charity, our presence, our dialogue, and our love.”

Particularly significant was his commitment to synodality—a term unfamiliar to outsiders but central to Francis’ reform program. It is about nothing less than the transformation of the Church: away from a rigid hierarchy toward a participatory model that takes voices from below seriously. This vision represents a fundamental break with the exclusive, authority-based worldview of conservative circles, especially within US Catholicism. Under Leo, synodality will be emphasized even more strongly – which is likely to inevitably exacerbate tensions with MAGA-aligned Catholics.

Francis has repositioned the Church as a global actor for social justice. Now it is up to Pope Leo to use the tools he has been given not only to administer, but also to write Church history.

Martin Gak is a journalist, philosopher, and Vatican correspondent for Deutsche Welle, where he reports on religion, politics, and ethics at the intersection of global affairs.

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Globalization without America?

By the editorial team

[This article posted on April 24, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/14-2025/globalisierung-ohne-amerika/.]

Dear readers

No, it was not a belated April Fool’s joke when Donald Trump announced the “most extreme trade measures in modern history” (quote from Thomas Fazi) with his sweeping tariff measures on April 2. In February and March, the US government had already imposed tariffs of 25 percent on steel, aluminum, and car imports.

In addition, Trump said that tariffs of at least 10 percent would apply to all goods from countries outside North America, and as much as 20 percent for the EU. A week later, on April 9, came the provisional U-turn: the US president suspended the previously announced country-specific “reciprocal” tariffs for 90 days to allow bilateral deals with trading partners. Meanwhile, tariffs on Chinese goods have risen to 145 percent. That’s the current situation. Everything is subject to change, of course.

With the erratic US president, it is difficult to predict whether this will remain the case. This is not what planning security looks like for companies. The global economy is in danger of losing momentum. The IMF has assessed the impact of Trump’s tariff policy and lowered its economic forecasts for most countries. “The global economy is at a critical juncture,” says the new World Economic Outlook. The outlook is also bleak for the eurozone and the German economy in particular, which remains mired in stagnation.

But even the US is unlikely to benefit from the tariff chaos it has brought upon itself. The stated goal of bringing production back to the United States and “restoring American prosperity” is evaporating into the question posed by US entrepreneur Molson Hart in this issue: whether this tariff policy means the “end of globalization” or just the end of America’s participation in globalization.

Nevertheless, as much as the free trade so beloved in Brussels is not the be-all and end-all, tariffs are not inherently evil – provided they are well thought out, legally sound, and well communicated. Companies looking to invest can hardly afford economic policy that zigzags from one direction to another. Nevertheless, the desire to protect one’s own industry and bring sectors back to domestic soil is a legitimate government goal, especially in light of the upheavals caused by globalization. This view is shared by Hart and MAKROSKOP authors Ann Pettifor and Thomas Fazi.

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Arms race: A military bastard Keynesianism?

By the editorial team

[This editorial posted on April 3, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/13-2025/aufrustung-ein-militarischer-bastard-keynesianismus/.]

Dear readers

Whether in the media, from politicians, or in everyday conversation, hardly any other political decision has been discussed as much in the last three years as the “turning point” speech by outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz. However, the subsequent special defense fund seems strangely small compared to the special infrastructure fund that parliament approved in the previous legislative period.

At that time, the fund amounted to €100 billion—five times as much in nominal terms today, albeit slightly less in real terms due to inflation. And even more importantly, by exempting defense and security spending of more than one percent of GDP from the debt brake in the future, parliament is giving itself a free pass for rearmament.

Given the plan to finance the increase in military spending with far-reaching debt, the question arises as to how much of this bears Keynes’s hallmark. Was it not Keynes who emphasized the economic stimulus effect of government debt? So do the rearmament loans promise an “olive-green economic miracle,” to use the words of ifW chairman Moritz Schularick?

Our authors are skeptical, given the history of rearmament programs in the US and Nazi Germany. In this issue, economist Michael Roberts argues that a core element of Keynesian programs was lost in the US’s war Keynesianism: private consumption. While the government encouraged the population to curb consumption through war bonds, rationed goods, and tax increases, and made the bulk of the investment in armaments, companies increased their profits—and reduced their investments.

Our author Hartmut Reiners also argues against associating Keynes with the war economy, citing the economic policies of the Nazis as an example. Like Roberts, Reiners emphasizes the importance of consumer restraint. In his case, this refers to the restraint in consumption that the German fascists propagated with the prospect of appropriating looted goods from the conquered territories.

In addition, Reiners emphasizes that job creation measures – for which the Nazis are sometimes credited with Keynesianism – were much less important than is often suggested. While the Hitler fascists cut funding for employment programs, they mainly put people to work through forced labor. The impact on wages and working conditions was correspondingly modest.

So what remains of Keynes? Historically, at least, one could say: an instrumental relationship.

And today? While the black-red government implicitly embraces Keynes’ insights on credit financing of public spending, essential ideas on employment and the welfare state are being pushed into the background. It is no coincidence that the black-red coalition is currently discussing budget cuts that will primarily affect citizens’ income. So is a military bastard Keynesianism looming once again?

All articles in this issue:

Authoritarianism is Turkey’s greatest economic risk Twelve years ago, crowds poured into the streets of Istanbul to save Gezi Park from being turned into a shopping center. Now the masses are back on the streets—not to save green spaces, but because of increasing lawlessness and creeping authoritarianism. Şebnem Kalemli-Özcan
The Le Pen case: The EU wanted to get rid of her – now Brussels is ducking away The French far-right politician has been convicted of embezzlement by a Paris court and is barred from running in the next presidential election. Is this compatible with democracy and the rule of law? Brussels remains silent. At stake are EU funds – and important principles. Eric Bonse
Retired Colonel Wolfgang Richter: “There will be no European ‘sovereignty’ in the foreseeable future.” Military expert Wolfgang Richter on a new European security strategy without the US. Ulrike Simon
Trump’s blind spot weighs 16 trillion dollars Convinced of an easy victory, Trump is waging a tariff war to reduce the US trade deficit. But he overlooks how important exports of services, intellectual property, and investment are to the economic dominance of the United States. Ricardo Hausmann
From Welfare to Warfare: War Keynesianism Does war Keynesianism deserve its name? Proponents of rearmament attribute macroeconomic benefits to it. But the war economy strikes at the heart of Keynesian demand programs: private consumption. Michael Roberts
The Tesla Syndrome Tesla’s sales figures have been falling dramatically since Donald Trump was elected US president. How much of this is due to Elon Musk’s own behavior? Tiago Cardão-Pito
Was Hitler a Keynesian? The claim by MAKROSKOP author Alfred Kleinknecht that the Nazis successfully combated unemployment with “military Keynesianism” is questionable. The establishment of a war economy, which began in 1935, was accompanied by forced labor and consumer restraint and did not lead to growing prosperity. Hartmut Reiners
The hidden mechanisms of the banking world The banking sector is characterized by a number of little-known peculiarities. This makes it all the more important to shed light on the subject, because effective regulation requires a deeper understanding of monetary theory and monetary policy. Michael Paetz
Democratic innovation: the way out of the crisis Peter Müller coaches works councils in their work. He has now launched an initiative to help entrepreneurs and employees alike find a way out of the crisis. Peter Müller
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China’s controlled market economy. Background to a boom

By th e editorial t e am

[This editorial posted on April 1, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/13-2025/chinas-gelenkte-marktwirtschaft-hintergrunde-eines-booms/.]

Rainer Land’s book on the Chinese economic miracle – now available in our webshop.

For Western societies, the rise of China poses a formidable challenge. But how did this boom come about, transforming a socialist country into one of the world’s largest economic powers within three decades? German economist Rainer Land analyzes China’s development from a planned economy to a controlled market economy and shows why this model has been so successful.

The author begins by examining the economic and theoretical background. Based on the “theory of economic development” of Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, he develops the concept of a guided market economy as currently observed in China. It is based on innovation-driven development in cooperation between companies, the financial system, and state and social actors. This requires a constantly renewed basic consensus in society that encompasses all key social groups. The process includes credit control, infrastructure policy, and innovation strategies.

On this basis, Land analyzes the stages of China’s development from a socialist planned economy (1949 to 1978) to a market economy (1978 to the mid-2000s) and on to a guided market economy. In 2007, a change of course was initiated and the development paradigm was shifted from extensive catch-up development to innovations oriented toward the domestic market.

The author

Rainer Land, born in Caputh (Brandenburg) in 1952, studied philosophy and economics at Humboldt University in Berlin, East Germany. In 2005, he was the founding initiator of the “Ostdeutschlandforschung” (East German Research) network. He works as a freelance economic researcher in Berlin.

Land, Rainer: Chinas gelenkte Marktwirtschaft. Hintergründe eines Booms (China’s controlled market economy. Background to a boom), Promedia 2025. 240 pp. 14.8 x 21. Paperback. >

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Democratic innovation: the way out of the crisis

By Peter Müller

[This article posted on April 1, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/13-2025/demokratische-innovation-der-weg-aus-der-krise/.]

Peter Müller is a coach who advises works councils in their work. He has now launched an initiative to help entrepreneurs and employees alike find a way out of the crisis.

Under the slogans “Invest instead of cutting back!” and “We need investment in future-proof jobs, new technologies, and renewable energies,” more than 80,000 employees will demonstrate on March 15 at five large demonstrations organized by IG Metall to save their jobs. Despite this powerful public statement, many employees quietly fear that this approach will not work. Where should investments be made when many warehouses are already full and machines are standing idle? Many feel frustrated and helpless and hope that they will somehow be spared. Some have already given up.

The welfare state: under the wheels of market-liberal populism

CDU Secretary General Carsten Linnemann wants a “major citizen’s income reform” that goes “to the heart of the matter” – more precisely, to the foundations of the welfare state.

First- and second-order solidarity

Identifiable and unidentifiable authorities

Education for market obedience

[1] See Sauer, D., et al. (2018) Rechtspopulismus und Gewerkschaften. Eine arbeitsweltliche Spurensuche (Right-wing populism and trade unions. A search for clues in the world of work), Hamburg, p. 13 f., 89 ff.

[2] Blanchard, O./Illing, G.: Makroökonomie (Macroeconomics), 6th edition, Munich 2014, p. 235.

[3] Streeck, W.: Zwischen Globalismus und Demokratie. Politische Ökonomie im ausgehenden Neoliberalismus (Between Globalism and Democracy: Political Economy in the Twilight of Neoliberalism), Frankfurt am Main 2021, p. 27, 31f., 38-41.

Poor against poorer

Warlike – but unreasonable?

Our thinking about war and armament is distorted. How can we counteract this? A plea for more collective reason.

Without a middle ground, the whole thing falls apart – Why Germany needs to reorganize its integration policy

The Federal Republic of Germany was late in addressing the consequences of migration. Too late? What we can learn from Singapore and Denmark.

We won’t “make it” this way

Singapore: Mixing with order

Denmark: Integration through self-assertion

Germany: Between utopia and self-denial

No community without cultural anchors

Is Trump jeopardizing our drug supply?

Donald Trump wants to force the US pharmaceutical industry to offer its drugs in the US at the lowest price they charge in other countries. Will we soon face drug prices as high as those in the US?

Fixed prices and discount agreements

Strategies of Big Pharma

Huge profits with few therapeutic areas

Outlook

“The shareholder has become common property”

We need institutions that do justice to us as human beings, says Armin Groh. This also includes democratizing the economy. A conversation about his book “The Blind Spots of Democracy.”

Market economies: from rulers to tools?

The transformation of the market economy

For Karl Polanyi, the idea of a self-regulating market was “a blatant utopia.” He wanted to transform markets from “a ruler into a tool for our purposes.” An assessment.

Markets as the ideal means of coordination for anonymous and fleeting business relationships

The unbearable lightness of the price mechanism

The ethical penetration of markets

Professions

Supply and demand

How the accumulation of non-market elements within the market economy is interpreted

[1] Geser, Hans 1983: Structural Forms and Functional Performance of Social Systems: A Sociological Paradigm. Opladen, 112

[2] Ibid., 113

[3] Mandel, Ernest n.d.: In Defense of the Socialist Planned Economy. n.p., 83 p. (German translation from New Left Review No. 150, 161, 169), 15

[4] Hayek, Friedrich August 1976: Individualism and Economic Order. Salzburg, 113

[5] Ibid., 115

[6] Pirker, Reinhard 2004: Markets as a Form of Social Regulation. Marburg, 81

[7] See Creydt, Meinhard 2024: Quality and Quantity. How can one-dimensional methods of calculation be replaced by multidimensional evaluation standards? In: Telepolis, April 13, 2024.

[8] Ibid., 268

[9] Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich: Works. Edited by Eva Moldenhauer, Karl Markus Michel. Frankfurt M. 1970, 395

[10] See Creydt, Meinhard 2017: The Poverty of Capitalist Wealth and the Good Life. Munich

[11] Hegel 7, 458f.

[12] Valderrama, Paula 2020: Democracy versus Market. Politics and Economics in Friedrich Hayek and Karl Polanyi. Marburg, 133

[13] Gorz, André 1967: On the Strategy of the Working Class in Neocapitalism. Frankfurt M., 119f.

[14] Elson, Diane 1990: Market Socialism or Socialization of the Market. In: Prokla, No. 78. Berlin, 75

[15] Polanyi, Karl 2005: The Great Transformation. Articles and Essays. Vol. 3, ed. by Michele Cangiani, Claus Thomasberger. Marburg, 147

[16] Ibid., 148

[17] Ibid., 272

[18] Pirker 2004, 36

[19] Polanyi, Karl 1978: The Great Transformation. Frankfurt M., 19f.

[20] Müller-Armack, Alfred 1974: Genealogy of the Social Market Economy. Bern, Stuttgart, 123

[21] cf. Polanyi 1978, 270, 314, 329

[22] Polanyi 2005, 128f.

The election of Pope Leo confirms Francis’ radical reforms

Pope Francis was considered by many to be a reformer without impact – a misconception fueled by a lack of understanding of the complex architecture of the Vatican. The election of his successor Leo shows that his changes were more profound than his critics suspected.

A formative friendship: the spiritual bridge between Francis and Leo

Pope Leo: A symbolic and political counterpoint

Synodality as a way forward

Globalization without America?

Arms race: A military bastard Keynesianism?

China’s controlled market economy. Background to a boom

Rainer Land’s book on the Chinese economic miracle – now available in our webshop.

Democratic innovation: the way out of the crisis

Peter Müller is a coach who advises works councils in their work. He has now launched an initiative to help entrepreneurs and employees alike find a way out of the crisis.

Entrepreneurs can’t do it

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