by Stephan Wohanka
There are phrases in political discourse that seem to be set in stone; the headline is one such phrase. It is thrown into the debate unquestioned, and everyone—almost everyone—nods in agreement. According to Sebastian Haffner, “such phrases have great suggestive power. Those who read them feel as if a light has suddenly been switched on: the confusing becomes simple, the difficult becomes easy. They give those who willingly accept them a pleasant feeling of enlightenment and knowledge, and they also arouse a certain angry impatience toward those who do not accept them, because the undertone in such words of power always resonates: ‘… and everything else is a hoax.’”
If we look around the world today, three countries immediately stand out that pursue their interests with brute force, sometimes resorting to (verbal) aggression and violations of international law: Russia, Israel, and the US.
Russia is waging a war against Ukraine that violates international law, and the stakes are much higher than just the front lines. It is about a historical conflict, about the question of what a European peace order should look like in the future. This should also be the subject of desirable peace negotiations. Russia was and is an empire; it subjugated other peoples for long periods of time and expanded its territory into the vast empire it once was. Putin’s policies are rightly described as “neo-imperial.” He is concerned with territorial revision, with empire itself; history is replacing the future. An economically prosperous Ukraine, democratic and governed by the rule of law (admittedly still a long way from this ideal) and removed from Russian influence would be the very antithesis of Putin’s imperial vision. His interest so far has been in maintaining a state of fundamental insecurity.
He is the only one who can protect Israel, says Benjamin Netanyahu. But isn’t he protecting himself above all else? The prime minister is on trial for corruption and abuse of office, and the domestic intelligence service is investigating him for breach of confidentiality. Netanyahu is therefore fighting just as fiercely at home as he is abroad – against some of the country’s most important institutions, against the judiciary, the Supreme Court, and his own trial.
The debate over Israel’s unrestricted warfare in the Gaza Strip is becoming increasingly heated, with a large majority of the population wanting a hostage deal and a ceasefire. Benny Gantz, a former minister in the war cabinet, wrote that freeing the hostages is the most urgent task and not only Israel’s war aim, but also “our moral (emphasis added) imperative as a country and as a people.” Here, too, the interests are clear: Netanyahu wants to buy time to secure his political immunity. The war prolongs the polarization between his supporters—right-wing nationalist and religious groups—and liberal forces; a protracted conflict helps the former, i.e., Netanyahu.
During the election campaign, Trump still presented himself as an isolationist: he wanted to “stay out of it,” “reduce the footprint,” and ensure domestic order. Then he did exactly the opposite, threatening to annex Greenland and the Panama Canal and make Canada the 51st state of the US. What does he hope to achieve with this?
Trump should be seen primarily as a businessman; his presidency is a vehicle for personal enrichment. This is also the purpose of his desire to make the US stronger in its confrontation with China and his dithering over a peace deal in the Ukraine war. Trump’s “foreign policy” influences local and regional conflicts, such as the one in the Middle East, and undermines international law and democratic principles.
Even more problematic than the purely economic costs of tariffs is Trump’s tendency to link foreign trade and security policy and thus blackmail other countries. Historians see Trump’s presidency as “the most corrupt in US history.”
These three countries act externally as subjects of international law, i.e., they pursue “interests.” And they push them through without any moral scruples. On closer inspection, however, it becomes clear that what their leaders are responsible for or have triggered serves their own personal interests, sometimes directly, sometimes indirectly, and only partially coincides with the interests of the populations of these countries, let alone those of the world. All three are responsible for a geopolitical rupture that, in its radicalism, would have been considered almost impossible.
The daily news and images from the war in Ukraine and Gaza show the world the horrors of “warfare” on a daily basis. In the first case, the aim is to break the morale of the defenders; in the second, ethnic expulsion is being carried out; one of Netanyahu’s henchmen, Bezalel Smotrich, puts it clearly: “We will conquer, cleanse, and remain in Gaza.”
According to German-Jewish historian Michael Wolffsohn, “there is no proportionality in war.” Hamas “wilfully and knowingly accepts its own civilians as cannon fodder” and “the moment Hamas lays down its arms and releases the hostages, […] this war is over.” Is Wolffsohn unaware of Smotrich’s statement, despite being a member of Netanyahu’s cabinet? Given his clear “message,” it is more likely that Palestinian civilian casualties were very much part of Israel’s calculations, and that military operations resulting in many civilian casualties are indeed disproportionate. The principles of proportionality are not only legally and technically motivated, but also ethically motivated—they are intended to prevent unnecessary or excessive suffering and maintain a certain balance; these are genuinely moral concerns.
The “interest-morality debate” cannot be pinned down to these three states; “normal” states are in the vast majority. They generally follow what is known as realism in foreign policy, which means that they act rationally to maximize the enforcement of their interests and their security in a disordered world. As far as the latter is concerned, this approach leads—as can be observed—to a security dilemma. For if states strive to maintain at least an equal, if not superior, level of (military) power in order to deter potential aggressors, and if they take (military and political) measures to strengthen their own security for this purpose, this is perceived as a threat by other states, which quickly leads to cycles of escalation.
National interests based on different values, power constellations, and dependencies logically clash with other national interests in the global arena. If we want to avoid constant conflicts of interest, which often lead to military conflicts, we need to balance interests. In addition to avoiding conflicts and wars, there is a need to address global problems such as climate change, pandemics, terrorism, migration, and economic crises; no state could solve them alone. A functioning balance of interests promotes international stability because it creates reliability, trust, and rules that states can use as a guide, for example through international law or multilateral institutions. A fair balance prevents stronger countries from acting permanently at the expense of weaker ones. It enables greater justice, for example in trade agreements, environmental policy, or the distribution of vaccines.
Without a balance of interests, global discord, conflicts, and abuse of power would spiral out of control. It is therefore a huge mistake to believe that the “world” can only be held together by politics – i.e. interests. No – it is only through treaties, law and legislation that it remains united; all derivatives of morality. Morality is the foundation on which (international) politics should be shaped and pursued, despite all (necessary) opportunism. When morality in politics degenerates into indoctrination or proselytizing, it has been misunderstood: its role is that of a standard-setter, a source of justification, and a long-term influencing factor.
Those who say that it is only about interests, not (also) about morality, are speaking with political cynicism. Today more than ever. Those who reject morality will soon suffer from its absence.