“It is more difficult than ever to argue in favor of an interventionist state” by Thomas Fazi, 10/15/2025

Thomas Fazi: “It is more difficult than ever to argue in favor of an interventionist state”

Interview

By the editorial team of Makroskop.eu

[This interview posted on October 15, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://makroskop.eu/36-2025/es-ist-schwieriger-denn-je-fur-einen-intervenierenden-staat-zu-argumentieren/.]

Thomas Fazi warns against a post-liberal order in which the state appears either as an instrument of repression or as a powerless administrator. In this conversation, he explains why a democratic reclaiming of state sovereignty is more urgent – and at the same time more difficult – today than ever before.

Thomas Fazi, born in London in 1982, lives in Italy, where he works as a publicist, journalist, and filmmaker. He contributed to the book “Kriegsfolgen. Wie der Kampf um die Ukraine die Welt verändert” (2023), published by Promedia Verlag. His book “Reclaiming the State,” which he co-authored with William Mitchell, has now been published in German by Edition MAKROSKOP.

Mr. Fazi, your book was first published in English in 2017 under the title Reclaiming the State. How controversial was your call for a stronger nation-state that intervenes directly in economic affairs at the time?

At the time, the book’s central thesis—that the recovery of national sovereignty was a necessary prerequisite for the restoration of democracy and economic self-determination—was at odds with much of the prevailing opinion on both the left and right sides of the political spectrum. At the time, the biggest obstacle to this project was the pseudo-progressive rejection of the neoliberal consensus: a decades-long ideological straitjacket that equated state power with authoritarianism and reactionary politics.

Has anything changed in this regard today?

Today, the terrain has changed dramatically. In recent years, latent trends have accelerated: the expansion of state repression, the militarization of political life, and the hardening of an authoritarian post-liberal order. These developments followed a clear sequence. The Covid-19 pandemic was the first turning point, ushering in a new era of emergency politics, widespread censorship, and the normalization of executive overreach. The war in Ukraine has further cemented this logic, with dissenting voices being criminalized, banned from platforms, and blacklisted by the media. Now, the West’s uncritical support for Israel’s war in Gaza—which has been met with mass protests and severe state repression—has revealed once and for all the violent foundations of the liberal international order.

That’s a very sharp criticism. What conclusions do you draw from this?

This escalation of repression has had an unintended consequence: it has fueled deep and growing skepticism toward the state, especially among those segments of the population most disillusioned with the status quo. In many cases, this disillusionment has driven people not to the left, but to the populist or nationalist right. This shift is not only the result of a cultural counter-movement, but also of a real political vacuum – a vacuum that the left has largely been unable to fill.

“It is more difficult than ever to argue for a renewed, democratic, and economically interventionist role for the state.”

Against this backdrop, it is becoming more difficult than ever to argue for a renewed, democratic, and economically interventionist role for the state. A political vision that focuses on national sovereignty and economic control by the people inevitably implies a “stronger state,” but also a state that is much more responsive to the demands of the people. Yet the state as it exists today is widely (and understandably) perceived as an enforcer of elite interests rather than a vehicle for collective emancipation. This is the central challenge facing any attempt to “reclaim the state” today.

Why are right-wing parties benefiting most from today’s widespread skepticism toward the state?

The most obvious answer is that they fill the void left by the failure and defeat of the populist left—which still offered hope at the time of the book’s first publication. The anti-establishment movement of the 2010s gave rise to new left-wing populist parties such as Podemos in Spain, Syriza in Greece, and the Five Star Movement in Italy. Although these interconnected phenomena differed in their ideology and goals, they all rejected the (neo-)liberal order that had dominated the world—and especially the West—for the previous two to three decades.

These electoral uprisings have largely failed. Why?

On the one hand, this was certainly due to the fierce reaction of the establishment, which used a variety of instruments to absorb and neutralize these attempts. Others – such as Corbyn and Sanders – were stopped by propaganda and covert and extralegal means.

However, part of the blame also lies with the ideological prejudices of the left-wing populists themselves. As far as the left-wing populist parliamentary experiments of the 2010s are concerned, on the one hand, they were too populist, i.e., they resisted the formalization of organizations and structures that were supposed to serve as mouthpieces for the will of the people; they were too “woke,” that is, too committed to the pseudo-radical identity politics and cosmopolitan worldview of left-liberal activists from the professional leadership class to appeal to an ideologically increasingly diverse (but predominantly culturally conservative) working class; and not radical enough to deal with the consequences of a head-on collision with the apparatus of the “deep state” – or, in the case of Europe, with the institutions of the European Union.

And this political void has been filled in recent years by the populist right…

Yes, but looking at the recent wave of predominantly right-wing populist parties gaining support across Europe, one could predict an equally disappointing outcome for largely similar, albeit ideologically opposite, reasons: Although they are better attuned than the left to the culturally conservative leanings of the working class, they are too “anti-woke” – that is, too fixated on culture wars – to overcome the ideological divisions that still exist in society. In addition, right-wing parties are too committed to economic liberalism to provide answers for the majority of voters. Their main concerns are their socioeconomic situation and lack of economic security. They hope that their vote will bring them material benefits.

What is the populist right’s position on the issue of national sovereignty?

Right-wing populist parties also fear the consequences of truly enforced national sovereignty, which in the European context would inevitably lead to withdrawal from the EU. To make matters worse, they are too committed to a hegemonic, “pro-Western” worldview, which is itself a variant of liberal universalism that they reject in their own countries. This is most evident in their reflexive support for Israel and their portrayal of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in terms of Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.” All of this ultimately makes them incapable of seizing the opportunities arising from the emerging post-Western multipolar order—and, as far as Europe is concerned, of rejecting Atlantic influence on the continent.

That sounds as if you are advocating a radical middle way.

In my opinion, we need a new political offering that is capable of overcoming the false left-right dichotomy and taking seriously both the economic and cultural uncertainties that people feel today. One example would be legitimate concerns about the effects of mass immigration.

What does that mean in concrete terms?

It means combining demands that were previously associated with the social democratic and labor-friendly left—interventionist and redistributive government policies, higher pensions and minimum wages, generous social and social security policies, taxes on wealth, etc.—with positions that would today be characterized as culturally conservative. It means, first and foremost, recognizing that preserving and promoting traditions is just as important as stability, security, and a sense of community. This inevitably entails a more restrictive immigration policy. Parties offering such a left-conservative synthesis are virtually non-existent in the Western political landscape.
“Parties offering a left-conservative synthesis are virtually non-existent in the Western political landscape.”

Sahra Wagenknecht’s party is a notable exception. But the party’s performance in recent elections also shows how difficult it is to establish a “third alternative” when societies are so polarized between established parties on the one hand and the supposedly “anti-establishment right” on the other.

Her framework for an economic policy in the interests of the majority is reminiscent of the Keynesian welfare states of the postwar period. Many would say that Keynesianism already proved to be a reformist dead end and an illusion in the 1970s.

That’s a good point. When we talk about “Keynesianism,” we mean two different things that are often confused with each other: on the one hand, a theory that offers us a perspective for understanding how the economy works and provides us with tools for managing the economy; and second, an actual political framework that existed throughout the West between the 1940s and 1970s, albeit with significant differences between countries.

You are referring to the latter. The Keynesian framework of that era led to enormous improvements in the economic and social rights of citizens and workers. At the same time, however, many limitations were also revealed, mainly due to the fact that the political and economic elites made great efforts to resist the demands of the population for greater democratization and socialization of the economy. All of this was ultimately overturned when the political and economic conditions that had made these demands possible in the first place began to erode. We also explain this in the book.

So you refer positively to a theory from which you draw building blocks for the foundation of a new economic order?

Exactly, what interests me most is Keynesianism as a tool for understanding the economic policy levers that are necessary for economic control. These instruments should be understood as value-neutral, meaning they can be used for very different political goals—from socializing bank losses, building up war resources, and strengthening the power of the elite to achieving full employment and improved living conditions, and possibly even realizing varying degrees of democratic socialism.
“We should not try to restore the political framework of postwar social democracy, but rather build a new, people-centered economy for the 21st century.”

So the question is what kind of society we want to build. But regardless of how we answer that question, a correct understanding of Keynesianism—and perhaps more importantly, post-Keynesian theory, especially Modern Money Theory—is crucial to knowing the tools needed to achieve the desired policy outcomes. So you are right: we should not try to restore the political framework of postwar social democracy—which would be impossible anyway, given the radically changed material and political conditions of Western societies—but rather build a new, people-centered economy for the 21st century.

You write: There is no economic democracy without political sovereignty, and political sovereignty needs people who are willing to fight for it. What challenges must emancipatory movements overcome today?

Well, I see two main problems: The first is that, on the one hand, the legitimacy of political elites in the West is eroding and, on the other hand, public consensus is dwindling. As a result, elites are increasingly resorting to authoritarian tactics to maintain their power. They no longer limit themselves to influencing election results through media campaigns, censorship, litigation, or economic pressure. If these measures do not produce the desired result, they are increasingly willing to abandon the formal structures of democracy, including elections, altogether—as we have seen in Romania. At the same time, traditional instruments of control are being tightened: in much of the West, censorship has become routine, dissenting opinions are increasingly criminalized, propaganda is becoming more blatant again, and legal systems are being used as weapons to suppress opposition. These are, of course, major obstacles to systemic change.

Historically, all of this has occurred repeatedly in various forms. How, then, did the social and democratic achievements of the “golden age of capitalism” come about?

This brings us to a structural problem. If the masses succeeded in using democratic institutions to gain a certain degree of economic and political power during the so-called Keynesian era—and even then only to a limited extent—it was thanks to a combination of various factors. These included specific material conditions that enabled the organized power of the working class—embodied by trade unions, mass parties, and grassroots organizations—to act as a counterweight to the organized power of capital.

However, that world no longer exists. The deindustrialization of the West, the atomization of society, the weakening of trade unions, and the neoliberal erosion of the state have undermined the very conditions that made mass democracy possible in the first place. As a result, politics has become increasingly disconnected from material life. Elections still take place, but the social forces that were once able to translate electoral mandates into structural change have disappeared or been neutralized. This is the main reason why we are seeing a return to forms of overt oligarchy reminiscent of the pre-democratic era.
“The deindustrialization of the West, the atomization of society, the weakening of trade unions, and the neoliberal erosion of the state have undermined the very conditions that made mass democracy possible in the first place.”

So the question is: How can the massive imbalance of economic and political power created by the fragmentation of wage earners be challenged? We still have parties, elections, and election campaigns. Occasionally, there are large protests. Even the unions still have some members. But in reality, party membership has declined, voter turnout has fallen, and union density has declined sharply. As a result, the opportunities to represent the interests of the people at the state level are now severely limited.

This also explains why populist and anti-establishment movements—whether on the left or the right—tend to stall as soon as they reach the institutional threshold of power. Lacking a deep and organized presence among ordinary workers and employees, and with no control over economic power, these movements rarely go beyond rhetorical defiance or symbolic gestures. Elections may give them formal legitimacy, but without a solid social bloc behind them, they are quickly co-opted, isolated, or crushed by the concentrated power of established institutions, the media, and supranational government regimes.

They are referring to the European Union, which, after all, received the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

Since 2017, the inherently anti-democratic and authoritarian character of the EU has become increasingly apparent. The EU’s unconditional support for NATO’s geopolitical agenda, its economic warfare against dissenting member states, and its downright enthusiastic participation in global armament reveal its true character: it is not a peace project, but an imperial infrastructure for disciplining nations and peoples. In this context, the core argument of Reclaiming the State—that democratic sovereignty is impossible within the institutional straitjacket of the EU—has only become more relevant and urgent.

Leaving the EU is virtually impossible in real political terms, and the consequences are difficult to predict. What options remain for reclaiming the state?

Despite my gloomy answer, all hope is not lost. The dissolution of the geopolitical order that has historically underpinned Western dominance marks a profound shift in global power dynamics with significant implications for the ability of Western elites to maintain their power. For decades, this order—based on military superiority, economic hegemony, and cultural influence—enabled Western powers, led by the United States, to impose their political vision worldwide and often protect their domestic power structures from substantial challenges. However, the emergence of a multipolar world, driven by the rise of powers such as China, the expansion of the BRICS countries, and the opening up of much of the Global South to the West, signals the crumbling of this foundation.
“The populist surges that have characterized the last decade and a half are symptomatic of deeper fractures in the post-democratic structures of the West.”

In this context, the decline of the “unipolar moment” after the end of the Cold War not only calls into question the ability of Western elites to maintain their global hegemony, but also exposes the structural weaknesses of their domestic systems. The populist surges and anti-establishment movements that have characterized the last decade and a half have often been suppressed or neutralized, but they are symptomatic of deeper fractures in the post-democratic structures of the West. Without the geopolitical stability and economic dominance that once masked these internal contradictions, elites are now vulnerable to challenges they are increasingly unable to meet.

But this development also paves the way for the emergence of a new order—one that represents not only a reconfiguration of geopolitical power, but potentially a complete reshaping of political and economic systems. As Western elites struggle with their dwindling influence, opportunities may arise for new visions of governance and democracy.

Thomas Fazi/William Mitchell: How to Reclaim the State: Sovereignty in a Post-Neoliberal World, Promedia 2025, 280 pages.