https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2025/09/13/18879822.php
[This interview published on September 11, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.philomag.de/artikel/christian-neuhaeuser-ungleichheit-ist-gewalt-wenn-sie-erhebliche-verletzungen-verursacht.]Which inequalities are unjust? And why do we live in a society of anger? Philosopher Christian Neuhäuser on problematic elites, current distribution struggles, and the resistance that is needed.
Mr. Neuhäuser, you research issues of inequality—what kind of inequality are you concerned with?
I originally came from a background of studying economic inequality, especially issues of poverty. In the course of my academic development, however, I have repeatedly been confronted with other forms of inequality, including through philosophical discourses dealing with problems of racism and sexism.
This shows that different forms of inequality have something in common: inequalities are always problematic when they involve violations. This applies to a great many inequalities. These include some that are not at the center of public discourse, but which I nevertheless consider problematic and important to address. One example would be physical appearance. It is a fact that people who are overweight are often confronted with massive discrimination. I consider this to be a violation. So I am not concerned with a specific form of inequality, but with all forms of inequality that have the potential to be hurtful. By this I mean that they attack people in the equality of their personality.
Does the existence of such an injury also determine whether an inequality is unjust? Or do all forms of inequality constitute injustice?
No, all inequalities must be examined for injury. And my suggestion is: if you can show that certain inequalities are systematically associated with injury, then they are definitely candidates for injustice. Inequalities are not mere differences because they are socially significant. Two people may have physical differences, for example in the size of their appendix, but that is not inequality. An example of inequality, on the other hand, is hair color in certain subcultures: someone has dyed their hair blue, someone else green, which is meant to express something in a particular subculture. This is an inequality, but it is not accompanied by any violation. Therefore, there is little to suggest that this inequality is unjust.
What is the current situation regarding unjust forms of inequality? Is our society particularly unequal?
Income inequality, and wealth inequality in particular, is currently increasing sharply. This is particularly true when purchasing power is taken into account – due to the extreme rise in costs on the housing market. This leads to distribution struggles, which in turn lead to social hostility and the formation of camps, but also to the lighting of smoke bombs. Then, recipients of citizen’s income, migrants, and transgender people are targeted in order to distract from the real problems. So yes, inequalities and the violence of inequalities are increasing.
Do you have a theory about where exactly this inequality—both economic and sociological—comes from?
The big anthropological question of inequality has been preoccupying philosophers since at least Rousseau. I still consider his answer to be the best: people want a higher status than others out of self-love. I would combine this with the insights of critical theory, as it is about calming existential fears. At the same time, the liberal mainstream wants to explain to us that status and honor no longer play a role in our societies. This seems to me to be the greatest delusion of the century. The concrete current development can be easily described as follows: the end of the moderating rivalry between capitalism and socialism, the triumph of neoliberalism, the globalization of financial markets as an instrument of power, the self-immunization of the wealthy class against any reasonable argumentation and criticism. This creates a society of anger. The rest follows from this.
You associate hurtful inequalities with the concept of “violence.” Can you elaborate on that?
Inequality is violence when it causes significant harm—physically, psychologically, or to one’s identity. A slap in the face hurts briefly, but the resulting humiliation has a stronger effect. Even if one’s own identity is violated without causing psychological suffering, it is still violence. For example, if someone is denied the opportunity to live out their social gender identity, they may not suffer psychologically, but rather resist it psychologically. Nevertheless, that person’s identity is violated because they are unable to live it out.
One could argue that this definition of violence is very broad because it is not necessary for the perpetrator to use violence intentionally; it can also happen unintentionally.
Many people think that violence must be intentional, usually in the form of physical injury. However, this obscures many forms of violence. If someone is seriously injured, the lack of intent does not change the injury. The problem is that injuries often happen incidentally, without conscious intent. Imagine a party where everyone is having a great time, but one person is excluded because no one is interested in them. This can be extremely hurtful, even if no one means it to be. Now let’s imagine that this happens to this person all the time. In a definition that includes intent, this would not be considered violence, even though psychological humiliation or belittling people causes lasting harm. Violence should not be viewed from the perspective of the perpetrator, but from the perspective of the victim.
In your book, you advocate resistance to this violence. What kind of resistance are you talking about?
First of all, it is important to me that resistance itself should be nonviolent. One should strive not to cause significant harm to others, whether physical, psychological, or related to identity. This is controversial. Some people think that civil disobedience or resistance may involve violence. I am very skeptical about this because I think it leads to spirals of violence and is often ineffective. In my view, resistance to violence should instead rely on moral resources, as Gandhi and Martin Luther King did.
What are the arguments in favor of this, in your opinion?
You lose your moral integrity when you use violence yourself. I’m not saying that violence should never be used; it is perfectly legitimate in self-defense. But we are talking here about a different kind of resistance, namely resistance against certain structures of violence, against systemic violence that is not merely situational.
That is why I consider movements such as MeToo and Black Lives Matter to be very important forms of nonviolent resistance. A second step, however, is to develop forms of community that have social power. The question is: How can progressive movements succeed in building social power that can break down violent structures?
Do you have an answer to that?
Well, if only I did. I am dissatisfied with two answers. First, that of Bourdieu and his narrative of the intellectual who exposes power relations and thus holds up a mirror to people. Second, the flirtation—for example, in critical theory—with avant-garde movements that notoriously fail to reach the broad majority of people, probably because they are perhaps too self-absorbed. Ultimately, what is needed is the organization and politicization of the poor with progressive intentions. But who will do that? At the moment, these people are more likely to be mobilized by the right wing through forms of reactionary recognition.
When you call for resistance, are you addressing specific actors who should provide it?
Everyone is definitely called upon to do so. But I also find Hannah Arendt and others convincing when they say that such resistance must come from those affected. Especially if one assumes that moral integrity is an essential part of resistance, those affected should of course play an important role in such resistance movements because they can strongly express this moral integrity.
Many people ask themselves what they can do themselves. What moral responsibility does the individual bear in the fight against social inequality or in this resistance? And where does the responsibility of the state begin?
In my view, the problem with responsibility is that in an ideal state, people could concentrate on their role as citizens and thus participate in an ideal political discourse. But we are a long way from this ideal state. As citizens who want to live together in dignity, we must recognize that the state, as the guarantor of dignified coexistence, is doing very little to fulfill its role. And it is doing less and less, because the state is increasingly in the hands of elites who act in their own interests. As the struggle for distribution intensifies due to a prolonged lack of economic growth, the tone is also becoming harsher.
At the same time, I believe that our responsibility is growing. Because if political actors fail to fulfill their responsibilities, there is something like a secondary responsibility that must be assumed. I also believe that you can only live well if you try to fulfill your moral responsibilities as best you can.
We currently have many parallel crises in different parts of the world: inflation, climate change, wars. Which crisis do you think most clearly illustrates distributive injustice?
I think that distributive injustice is represented in its own way in all crises. This is very striking in the climate crisis and in the economic division of labor. When it comes to climate change, future generations are completely powerless against us. Young people are also largely unable to act against the concentrated established power of the older generation. This can be seen, for example, in movements such as Fridays for Future or Last Generation.
Looking to the near future, how do you think inequality will develop?
My diagnosis is that things will have to get considerably worse before they get better. The reason for this is that too many people are currently clinging to the illusion that things are not that bad. As long as there are promises that life as it is now will continue to work, there will be a majority who are willing to bury their heads in the sand. In my view, the reason for this widespread attitude continues to be the trivialization or concealment of economic inequality and the fact that we have a class of rich people who are solely interested in maximizing their wealth.
Do you think that philosophy can do anything concrete today to counteract this inequality? Perhaps also when it comes to practical questions of justice, democracy, and distribution?
Our core business, the classic way of thinking about philosophy in public, so to speak, consists of writing books that are then discussed in feature pages and relevant magazines. But we should be clear that this only reaches a very small circle of the total population. To pretend that this is not the case is, in my opinion, disingenuous. What I also consider disingenuous is retreating into small biotopes of counter-movements. For me, these are not real counter-movements, but a kind of collective retreat into private life. Philosophy should therefore become more democratic, even more plebiscitary. •
Christian Neuhäuser is Professor of Practical Philosophy at TU Dortmund University. His research focuses on theories of dignity, responsibility, and property. His most recent publication is “Gewalt der Ungleichheit. Würde und Widerstand” (The Violence of Inequality: Dignity and Resistance), published by Reclam.