Europe in a trap – Why is Russia actually the enemy? by Jeffrey Sachs, 8/29/2025

Jeffrey Sachs: Europe in a trap – why is Russia actually the enemy?

Germany should not make enemies of Russia and China while the US attacks Europe and even threatens war over Greenland.

Geopolitics

Jeffrey Sachs

[This article posted on August 28, 2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.berliner-zeitung.de/politik-gesellschaft/jeffery-sachs-europa-in-der-falle-warum-ist-russland-eigentlich-der-feind-li.2352625.]

Europeans wait in an adjoining room while Trump talks to Putin on the phone. IMAGO/DANIEL TOROK

Under the title “A New Foreign Policy for Europe”, economist and diplomat Jeffrey Sachs published a fundamental analysis of the geopolitical dilemma facing Germany and Europe in Horizons Magazine, Summer 2025, Issue 31. We are publishing the analysis in German with the kind permission of Professor Sachs.

The European Union needs a new foreign policy based on Europe’s true economic and security interests. Europe currently finds itself in a self-created economic and security trap, characterized by its dangerous hostility toward Russia, its mutual distrust of China, and its extreme vulnerability to the United States.

European foreign policy is almost entirely determined by fear of Russia and China—which has led to security dependence on the United States. Europe’s subservience to the US stems almost exclusively from its overriding fear of Russia, a fear that has been exacerbated by the Russophobic states of Eastern Europe and a misrepresentation of the war in Ukraine.

Based on the belief that Russia poses its greatest security threat, the EU subordinates all other foreign policy issues – economy, trade, environment, technology, and diplomacy – to the United States.

Ironically, it clings tightly to Washington even though the United States has become weaker, more unstable, more unpredictable, more irrational, and more dangerous in its own foreign policy toward the EU—even going so far as to openly threaten European sovereignty in Greenland. To shape a new foreign policy, Europe must overcome the false assumption of its extreme vulnerability to Russia.

The narrative of Brussels, NATO, and the UK is that Russia is inherently expansionist and will overrun Europe if the opportunity arises. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1991 is supposed to illustrate this threat today. This false narrative fundamentally misunderstands Russian behavior in the past and present.

The first part of this essay aims to correct the false assumption that Russia poses a serious threat to Europe. The second part looks ahead to a new European foreign policy once Europe has overcome its irrational Russophobia.

The false premise of Russian Western imperialism

European foreign policy is based on the alleged security threat to Europe posed by Russia. But this premise is false. Russia has been repeatedly attacked by the major Western powers (especially Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) over the past two centuries and has long sought security through a buffer zone between itself and the Western powers. The fiercely contested buffer zone includes present-day Poland, Ukraine, Finland, and the Baltic states.

This region between the Western powers and Russia is responsible for the greatest security dilemmas facing Western Europe and Russia.

Wars of the West against Russia

The most important Western wars against Russia since 1800 include: The French invasion of Russia in 1812 (Napoleonic Wars); the British-French invasion of Russia in 1853–1856 (Crimean War); Germany’s declaration of war on Russia on August 1, 1914 (World War I); the Allied intervention in the Russian Civil War 1918–1922 (Russian Civil War); and the German invasion of Russia in 1941 (World War II). Each of these wars posed an existential threat to Russia’s survival.

From Russia’s perspective, the failed demilitarization of Germany after World War II, the founding of NATO, the integration of West Germany into NATO in 1955, NATO’s eastward expansion after 1991, and the ongoing expansion of US military bases and missile systems in Eastern Europe near the Russian border represent the greatest threats to Russia’s national security since World War II.

Russia has also advanced westward on several occasions: Russia’s attack on East Prussia in 1914; the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact in 1939, which divided Poland between Germany and the Soviet Union and annexed the Baltic states in 1940; the invasion of Finland in November 1939 (Winter War); the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe from 1945 to 1989; and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Europe views these Russian actions as objective proof of Russia’s expansionism toward the West, but such a view is naive, unhistorical, and propagandistic. In all five cases, Russia acted to protect its national security—as it saw it—and did not pursue westward expansion for its own sake.

This fundamental truth is the key to resolving the current conflict between Europe and Russia. Russia does not seek westward expansion; Russia seeks its core national security. But the West has long failed to recognize Russia’s core national security interests, let alone respect them.

Russia’s wars against the West

Let us consider these five cases of Russia’s alleged westward expansion. The first case, Russia’s attack on East Prussia in 1914, can be dismissed immediately.

The German Empire was the first to declare war on Russia on August 1, 1914. Russia’s invasion of East Prussia was a direct response to Germany’s declaration of war.

The second case, Soviet Russia’s agreement with Hitler’s Third Reich to divide Poland in 1939 and annex the Baltic states in 1940, is seen in the West as clear evidence of Russian villainy. This, too, is a simplistic and false reading of history. As historians such as E. H. Carr, Stephen Kotkin, and Michael Jabara Carley have carefully documented, Stalin sought contact with Britain and France in 1939 to form a defensive alliance against Hitler, who had declared his intention to wage war against Russia in the East (for Lebensraum, Slavic slave labor, and the defeat of Bolshevism). Stalin’s attempt to forge an alliance with the Western powers was decisively rejected. Poland refused to allow Soviet troops on Polish soil in the event of war with Germany. The Western elite’s hatred of Soviet communism was at least as great as their fear of Hitler. In fact, a common phrase among the British right-wing elite in the late 1930s was: “Better Hitlerism than communism.”

Unable to forge a defensive alliance, Stalin attempted to create a buffer zone against the impending German invasion of Russia.

The partition of Poland and the annexation of the Baltic states were carried out for tactical reasons, to buy time for the impending battle of Armageddon with Hitler’s armies, which arrived on June 22, 1941, with the German invasion of the Soviet Union as part of Operation Barbarossa. The preceding partition of Poland and annexation of the Baltic states may well have delayed the invasion and saved the Soviet Union from a quick defeat against Hitler.

Finland and Russia

The third case, Russia’s Winter War against Finland, is also seen in Western Europe (and especially in Finland) as evidence of Russia’s expansionist character. But here, too, Russia’s fundamental motivation was defensive, not offensive. Russia feared that the German invasion would take place partly via Finland and that Leningrad could be quickly taken by Hitler. The Soviet Union therefore proposed a territorial exchange with Finland (in particular, the cession of the Karelian Isthmus and some islands in the Gulf of Finland in exchange for Russian territories) to enable Russia to defend Leningrad. Finland rejected this proposal and the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. Finland then joined Hitler’s armies in the war against the Soviet Union during the “Continuation War” from 1941 to 1944.

Occupation of Eastern Europe by the USSR

The fourth case, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe (and the continued annexation of the Baltic states) during the Cold War, is seen in Europe as further bitter proof of the fundamental threat to European security posed by Russia. The Soviet occupation was indeed brutal, but it too had defensive motives that are completely overlooked in the Western European and American narrative. The Soviet Union bore the brunt of the victory over Hitler, losing an incredible 27 million citizens in the war. Russia had one primary demand after the war ended: its security interests should be safeguarded by a treaty that protected it from future threats from Germany and the West in general. The West, led today by the US, rejected this fundamental security demand. The Cold War is the result of the West’s refusal to respect Russia’s vital security interests.

Of course, the history of the Cold War as told in the West is exactly the opposite: the Cold War was solely the result of Russia’s bellicose attempts to conquer the world!

Here is the true story, well known to historians but almost completely unknown to the public in the United States and Europe. At the end of the war, the Soviet Union sought a peace treaty that would create a united, neutral, and demilitarized Germany.

The West wanted to divide Germany, not demilitarize it

At the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, attended by the heads of state and government of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States, the three Allies agreed on “the complete disarmament and demilitarization of Germany and the elimination or control of all German industry that could be used for military production.” Germany was to be unified, pacified, and demilitarized. All this was to be secured by a treaty ending the war. In fact, the US and Britain worked tirelessly to undermine this core principle. As early as May 1945, Winston Churchill tasked his military chief of staff with drawing up a war plan for a surprise attack on the Soviet Union in mid-1945, codenamed Operation Unthinkable.

Although British military planners considered such a war unfeasible, the idea quickly gained traction that the Americans and British should prepare for an impending war with the Soviet Union. The war planners considered such a war likely in the early 1950s. Churchill’s goal was apparently to prevent Poland and other Eastern European countries from falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. In the United States, too, leading military planners considered the Soviet Union to be America’s next enemy just a few weeks after Germany’s surrender in May 1945. The US and Britain quickly recruited Nazi scientists and high-ranking intelligence officers (such as Reinhard Gehlen, a Nazi leader who was supported by Washington in setting up the postwar German intelligence service) to begin planning for the impending war against the Soviet Union.

Germany’s admission to NATO

The Cold War broke out mainly because the Americans and British rejected German reunification and the demilitarization agreed upon in Potsdam. Instead, the Western powers abandoned German reunification and founded the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) from the three occupation zones of the US, the UK, and France. Under American auspices, the FRG was to be reindustrialized and remilitarized. In 1955, West Germany was admitted to NATO.

While historians debate fiercely about who complied with the Potsdam Agreements and who did not (with the West pointing, for example, to the Soviet Union’s refusal to allow a truly representative government in Poland, as agreed in Potsdam), there is no doubt that the remilitarization of the Federal Republic of Germany by the West was the main cause of the Cold War. In 1952, Stalin proposed the reunification of Germany on the basis of neutrality and demilitarization.

Austria’s neutrality since 1955

This proposal was rejected by the US. In 1955, the Soviet Union and Austria agreed that the Soviet Union would withdraw its occupation troops from Austria if Austria, in return, guaranteed permanent neutrality. The Austrian State Treaty was signed on May 15, 1955, by the Soviet Union, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, together with Austria, thus bringing the occupation to an end. The Soviet Union’s goal was not only to resolve tensions over Austria, but also to show the United States a successful model of Soviet withdrawal from Europe while maintaining neutrality.

Once again, the United States rejected the Soviet appeal to end the Cold War on the basis of German neutrality and demilitarization. As late as 1957, the American doyen on Soviet affairs, George Kennan, in his third Reith Lecture for the BBC, publicly and passionately appealed to the United States to agree with the Soviet Union on a mutual withdrawal of troops from Europe. The Soviet Union, Kennan emphasized, was neither seeking nor interested in a military invasion of Western Europe.

The US Cold Warriors, led by John Foster Dulles, wanted nothing to do with this. Until German reunification in 1990, no peace treaty was signed with Germany to end World War II.

It should be noted that after 1955, the Soviet Union respected the neutrality of Austria and other neutral countries in Europe (including Sweden, Finland, Switzerland, Ireland, Spain, and Portugal). Finnish President Alexander Stubb recently stated that Ukraine should reject neutrality because of Finland’s negative experiences (Finnish neutrality ended in 2024 when the country joined NATO). This is a bizarre idea. Finland remained peaceful under neutral rule, achieved remarkable economic prosperity, and reached the highest level of satisfaction in the world according to the World Happiness Report.

Kennedy’s assassination, Nixon’s downfall

President John F. Kennedy showed a possible way to end the Cold War based on mutual respect for the security interests of all sides. Kennedy blocked German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer’s attempt to acquire nuclear weapons from France, thereby appeasing Soviet concerns about a nuclear-armed Germany. On this basis, JFK successfully negotiated the Partial Test Ban Treaty with his Soviet counterpart Nikita Khrushchev. Kennedy was assassinated a few months later, most likely because of his peace initiative, by a group of CIA agents. Documents released in 2025 confirm the long-standing suspicion that Lee Harvey Oswald was directly supervised by James Angleton, a high-ranking CIA employee.

The next US peace offer to the Soviet Union was led by Richard Nixon. He was brought down by the Watergate scandal, which also shows signs of a CIA operation that was never fully investigated.

Mikhail Gorbachev finally ended the Cold War by unilaterally dissolving the Warsaw Pact and actively promoting the democratization of Eastern Europe. I was involved in some of these events and witnessed Gorbachev’s peacemaking. In the summer of 1989, for example, Gorbachev called on the communist leadership of Poland to form a coalition government with the opposition forces led by the Solidarność movement.

Reunification and NATO’s eastward expansion

The end of the Warsaw Pact and Gorbachev’s democratization of Eastern Europe quickly led Chancellor Helmut Kohl to call for German reunification. This resulted in the 1990 reunification treaties between the FRG and the GDR, as well as the so-called 2+4 Treaty between the two German states and the four Allied powers: the US, the UK, France, and the Soviet Union.

In February 1990, the United States and Germany clearly promised Gorbachev that NATO would not move “one inch eastward” in connection with German reunification. This fact is largely disputed by the Western powers today, but it can be easily verified. This central promise not to continue NATO expansion was made several times, but was not included in the text of the 2+4 Agreement, as it concerned German reunification and not NATO’s eastward expansion.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine

The fifth case, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, is again seen in the West as proof of Russia’s incorrigible Western imperialism. The favorite word of Western media, experts, and propagandists is that Russia’s invasion was “unprovoked” and therefore proof of Putin’s relentless quest not only to restore the Russian Empire but also to advance further westward, which means that Europe should prepare for war with Russia. This is an absurd lie, but one that is repeated so often by the mainstream media that it is widely believed in Europe.

In fact, the Russian invasion in February 2022 was so provoked by the West that one might suspect it was actually an American plan to lure the Russians into a war in order to defeat or weaken Russia. This claim is credible, as confirmed by numerous statements from numerous US officials. After the invasion, US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that Washington’s goal was “to weaken Russia to the point where it is no longer capable of carrying out actions similar to the invasion of Ukraine. Ukraine can win if it has the right equipment and support.”

The most significant provocation by the US toward Russia was the eastward expansion of NATO, contrary to the promises made in 1990.

Russia and China allied? No way!

The aim was to encircle Russia with NATO countries in the Black Sea region and thus prevent Russia from deploying its naval power stationed in Crimea in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. Essentially, the US goal was the same as that of Palmerston and Napoleon III in the Crimean War: to drive the Russian fleet out of the Black Sea.

NATO members would include Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Georgia, forming a noose that would strangle Russia’s naval power in the Black Sea. Zbigniew Brzezinski described this strategy in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard.

In it, he claimed that Russia would bow to the will of the West because it had no other choice. Brzezinski explicitly rejected the idea that Russia would ever ally itself with China against Europe. The entire period since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 has been marked by Western hubris (as historian Jonathan Haslam titled his excellent report). During this period, the United States and Europe believed they could push NATO and American weapons systems (such as Aegis missiles) eastward without regard for Russia’s national security concerns.

The list of Western provocations is too long to detail here, but here is a summary:

Numerous Western provocations

First, contrary to its promises made in 1990, the United States began the eastward expansion of NATO, which began in 1994 with announcements by then-President Bill Clinton. At the time, Clinton’s Secretary of Defense, William Perry, considered resigning in view of the recklessness of this US action, contrary to earlier promises. The first wave of NATO expansion took place in 1999 and included Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. That same year, NATO forces bombed Russia’s ally Serbia for 78 days in an effort to divide the country, and NATO quickly established a new large military base in the breakaway province of Kosovo.

The second wave of NATO’s eastward expansion in 2004 included seven countries, including Russia’s direct neighbors in the Baltic states and two Black Sea countries—Bulgaria and Romania. In 2008, most of the EU recognized Kosovo as an independent state, contrary to European assurances that European borders were inviolable.

Second, in 2002, the US unilaterally terminated the ABM Treaty and thus nuclear arms control. In 2019, it similarly terminated the INF Treaty. Despite Russia’s strong objections, the US began deploying ABM systems in Poland and Romania and, in January 2022, reserved the right to deploy such systems in Ukraine.

Maidan: Violent coup

Third, the US infiltrated deeply into Ukrainian domestic politics, spending billions of dollars to influence public opinion, build media channels, and control Ukrainian domestic politics. The 2004–2005 elections in Ukraine are widely regarded as a kind of American color revolution, in which the US used its covert and overt influence and funding to sway the election in favor of US-backed candidates. In 2013 and 2014, the US played a direct role in financing the Maidan protests and the violent coup that overthrew neutrality-oriented President Viktor Yanukovych, paving the way for a Ukrainian regime that supports NATO membership.

Incidentally, shortly after the violent coup of February 22, 2014, which led to Yanukovych’s overthrow, I was invited to visit Maidan. The role of American funding in the protests was explained to me by a US NGO that was heavily involved in the Maidan events.

“Nyet means nyet”

Fourth, despite the objections of several European heads of state and government, the US pushed NATO from 2008 onwards to commit to enlargement to include Ukraine and Georgia. The then US ambassador to Moscow, William J. Burns, telegraphed a now infamous memo entitled “Nyet means nyet: Russia’s red lines on NATO enlargement” to Washington. In it, he explained that the entire Russian political class was strongly opposed to NATO expansion to include Ukraine and feared that such a move could lead to civil war in Ukraine.

Fifth, after the coup on the Maidan, the Russian-speaking regions of eastern Ukraine (Donbass) broke away from the new western Ukrainian government installed by the coup. Russia and Germany quickly agreed on the Minsk Agreements, according to which the two breakaway regions (Donetsk and Luhansk) would remain part of Ukraine, but with local autonomy modeled on the German-speaking region of South Tyrol in Italy. Minsk II, which was supported by the UN Security Council, could have ended the conflict, but the government in Kiev, with Washington’s support, decided against implementing autonomy.

The failure to implement Minsk II poisoned diplomacy between Russia and the West.

Sixth, the United States continuously expanded the Ukrainian army (active army plus reserves) to around one million soldiers by 2020. Ukraine and its right-wing paramilitary battalions (such as the Azov Battalion and the Right Sector) repeatedly carried out attacks on the two breakaway regions, killing thousands of civilians in Donbass through Ukrainian artillery fire.

Seventh, at the end of 2021, Russia presented a draft Russian-American security agreement, which primarily called for an end to NATO’s eastward expansion. The US rejected Russia’s demand for an end to NATO’s eastward expansion and reaffirmed its “open door policy,” according to which third countries such as Russia have no say in NATO expansion. The US and European countries repeatedly reaffirmed Ukraine’s potential NATO membership. According to reports, the US Secretary of State informed the Russian Foreign Minister in January 2022 that the US would retain the right to station medium-range missiles in Ukraine despite Russian objections.

No peace in Istanbul

Eighth, following the Russian invasion on February 24, 2022, Ukraine quickly agreed to peace negotiations based on a return to neutrality. These negotiations took place in Istanbul, mediated by Turkey. At the end of March 2022, Russia and Ukraine published a joint memorandum reporting on progress toward a peace agreement. On April 15, a document was presented that was close to a comprehensive agreement. At that point, the US intervened and informed the Ukrainians that it would not support the peace agreement, but would instead support Ukraine in continuing the fighting.

The high cost of failed foreign policy Russia has not made any territorial claims against Western European countries, nor has Russia threatened Western Europe, apart from its right to retaliate for Western-backed missile attacks in Russia. Until the Maidan coup in 2014, Russia did not make any territorial claims against Ukraine. After the 2014 coup and until the end of 2022, Russia’s only territorial claim was Crimea, in order to prevent the Russian naval base in Sevastopol from falling into Western hands.

Only after the failure of the Istanbul peace process – torpedoed by the US – did Russia claim the annexation of the four Ukrainian oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia). Russia’s declared war aims remain limited and include Ukraine’s neutrality, partial demilitarization, permanent withdrawal from NATO, and the transfer of Crimea and its four oblasts to Russia, which make up around 19 percent of Ukraine’s 1991 territory.

This is not evidence of Russian imperialism in the West.

Nor are these demands without merit. Russia’s war aims follow more than 30 years of Russian objections to NATO’s eastward expansion, the arming of Ukraine, the American withdrawal from the nuclear weapons agreement, and the West’s deep interference in Ukrainian domestic politics, including support for a violent coup in 2014 that put NATO and Russia on a direct collision course. Europe interprets the events of the last 30 years as proof of Russia’s relentless and incorrigible expansionism toward the West—just as the West insisted that the Soviet Union was solely responsible for the Cold War, when in reality the Soviet Union had repeatedly shown the way to peace through Germany’s neutrality, reunification, and disarmament.

Opponents talk past each other

As during the Cold War, the West preferred to provoke Russia rather than acknowledge its entirely understandable security concerns. Every Russian action was interpreted as a sign of Russian malice, without taking Russia’s position in the debate into account.

This is a vivid example of the classic security dilemma: opponents talk past each other, assume the worst, and act aggressively on the basis of their false assumptions. Europe’s decision to interpret the Cold War and the postwar period from this highly biased perspective has cost Europe dearly, and those costs continue to mount. Above all, however, Europe found itself completely dependent on the US for its security.

If Russia is indeed incorrigibly expansionist, then the US is Europe’s necessary savior. If, on the other hand, Russia’s behavior had indeed been an expression of its security concerns, the Cold War could most likely have ended decades earlier, following the example of Austrian neutrality, and the postwar period could have been a time of peace and growing trust between Russia and Europe.

The battle for raw materials

In fact, the economies of Europe and Russia complement each other: Russia is rich in raw materials (agriculture, minerals, hydrocarbons) and mechanical engineering, while Europe is home to energy-intensive industries and important high technologies. The US has long opposed the growing trade relations between Europe and Russia resulting from this natural complementarity. It views the Russian energy industry as a competitor to the US energy sector and generally sees the close German-Russian trade and investment relations as a threat to US political and economic dominance in Western Europe.

Nord Stream pipelines

For these reasons, the US opposed the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines long before the Ukraine conflict. Biden therefore explicitly promised to stop Nord Stream 2 in the event of a Russian invasion of Ukraine – which is what happened. US opposition to Nord Stream and the closure of German-Russian economic relations was based on general principles: The EU and Russia should be kept at a distance so that the US does not lose its influence in Europe. The war in Ukraine and the division of Europe with Russia have caused great damage to the European economy. Europe’s exports to Russia have fallen dramatically, from around €90 billion in 2021 to just €30 billion in 2024. Energy costs have skyrocketed as Europe has switched from cheap Russian pipeline natural gas to liquefied natural gas from the US, which is several times more expensive. German industry has shrunk by around 10 percent since 2020, and both the German chemical and automotive industries are faltering.

The IMF forecasts economic growth of only 1 percent for the EU in 2025 and around 1.5 percent for the rest of the decade.

German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has called for a permanent ban on the restoration of Nord Stream gas supplies, but for Germany this is tantamount to economic suicide. It is based on Merz’s view that Russia is seeking war with Germany, but the fact is that Germany is provoking war with Russia through warmongering and massive rearmament.

What does Friedrich Merz want?

According to Merz, “a realistic view of Russia’s imperialist ambitions is necessary.” He explains: “Part of our society has a deep-rooted fear of war. I do not share this fear, but I can understand it.” Particularly alarming is Merz’s statement that “the means of diplomacy have been exhausted,” even though he has apparently not even attempted to speak with Russian President Vladimir Putin since coming to power. Furthermore, he seems to be deliberately ignoring the near-success of diplomacy in the Istanbul process in 2022—that is, before the US put an end to diplomacy.

The West’s approach to China mirrors its approach to Russia. The West often attributes nefarious intentions to China that are in many ways merely projections of its own hostile intentions toward the People’s Republic. China’s rapid rise to economic supremacy between 1980 and 2010 led American politicians and strategists to view China’s continued economic rise as contrary to US interests.

In 2015, US strategists Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis clearly stated that the US’s grand strategy was American hegemony and that China, due to its size and success, posed a threat to that hegemony.

Blackwill and Tellis advocated a series of measures by the US and its allies to hinder China’s future economic success, such as excluding China from new trade blocs in the Asia-Pacific region, restricting exports of Western high-tech goods to China, imposing tariffs and other restrictions on Chinese exports, and other anti-China measures. Note that these measures were not recommended because of specific wrongdoings by China, but because China’s continued economic growth was contrary to American hegemony, according to the authors.

Mocking China

Part of foreign policy toward Russia and China is a media war to discredit these supposed enemies of the West. In the case of China, the West has portrayed it as committing genocide against the Uyghur population in Xinjiang province.

This absurd and exaggerated accusation was made without serious evidence, while the West generally ignores the actual genocide of tens of thousands of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip by its ally Israel. In addition, Western propaganda contains a series of absurd claims about the Chinese economy. China’s valuable Belt and Road Initiative, which finances the construction of modern infrastructure in developing countries, is derided as a “debt trap.”

China’s remarkable ability to produce green technologies such as the solar panels that are urgently needed worldwide is derided by the West as “overcapacity” that should be reduced or shut down. Militarily, the security dilemma vis-à-vis China, just like vis-à-vis Russia, is interpreted as highly threatening.

The US has long proclaimed its ability to disrupt China’s vital sea lanes, but labels China militaristic when it takes steps to build its own naval capabilities in response. Rather than viewing China’s military buildup as a classic security dilemma that should be resolved diplomatically, the US Navy says it should prepare for war with China by 2027. NATO is increasingly calling for active engagement in East Asia directed against China. The US’s European allies generally support the aggressive American approach to China, both commercially and militarily.

10 points for a new foreign policy for Europe

Europe has painted itself into a corner by subordinating itself to the US, refusing direct diplomatic relations with Russia, losing its economic advantage through sanctions and war, committing to massive and unaffordable increases in military spending, and severing long-term trade and investment relations with both Russia and China. The result is rising debt, economic stagnation, and a growing risk of a major war, which apparently does not scare Merz, but should scare the rest of us.

The most likely war may not be with Russia, but with the US, which under Trump threatened to occupy Greenland if Denmark did not simply sell it or transfer it to Washington’s sovereignty. It is entirely possible that Europe will eventually find itself without any real friends: not Russia or China, but also not the US, the Arab states (which resent Europe’s blind eye to Israel’s genocide), Africa (which still suffers from European colonialism and post-colonialism), and others. There is, of course, another way—a promising one, if European politicians reassess Europe’s true security interests and risks and put diplomacy back at the center of their foreign policy. I propose ten practical steps for a foreign policy that meets Europe’s real needs.

First: Establishing direct diplomatic contacts with Moscow. Europe’s apparent failure to establish direct diplomatic relations with Russia is disastrous. Europe may even believe its own foreign policy propaganda, as it does not discuss key issues directly with its Russian counterpart.

Second: Prepare for a negotiated peace with Russia regarding Ukraine and the future of European collective security. Above all, Europe should agree with Russia that the war should end on the basis of a firm and irrevocable commitment not to expand NATO into Ukraine, Georgia, or other eastern territories. In addition, Europe should accept some pragmatic territorial changes in Ukraine in favor of Russia.

Thirdly, Europe should reject the militarization of its relations with China, for example by rejecting any role for NATO in East Asia. China poses absolutely no threat to Europe’s security, and Europe should stop blindly supporting American hegemonic claims in Asia, which are dangerous and delusional enough even without Europe’s support. On the contrary, Europe should strengthen its trade, investment, and climate cooperation with China.

Fourth, Europe should opt for a sensible institutional mode of diplomacy. The current mode is unusable. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy acts mainly as a mouthpiece for Russophobia, while actual high-level diplomacy—if it exists at all—is confusing and alternately led by individual European heads of state and government, the EU’s High Representative, the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Council, or a combination of these individuals. In short, no one speaks clearly for Europe because there is no clear EU foreign policy at all.

Fifth, Europe should recognize that EU foreign policy must be separated from NATO. In fact, Europe does not need NATO, as Russia is not about to invade the EU. Europe should actually build up its own military capabilities independently of the US, but at a much lower cost than 5% of GDP – an absurd target based on a completely exaggerated assessment of the Russian threat. Furthermore, European defense should not be identical to European foreign policy, although the two have been completely confused with each other in the recent past.

Sixth, the EU, Russia, India, and China should work together on the green, digital, and transport modernization of the Eurasian region. The sustainable development of Eurasia is a win-win situation for the EU, Russia, India, and China and can only be achieved through peaceful cooperation between the four major Eurasian powers.

Seventh, Europe’s Global Gateway, the financing arm for infrastructure in non-EU countries, should cooperate with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Currently, the Global Gateway is portrayed as competing with the BRI. In fact, the two should join forces to jointly finance Eurasia’s green energy, digital, and transport infrastructure.

Eighth, the European Union should increase its funding for the European Green Deal (EGD), thereby accelerating Europe’s transformation to a low-carbon future, instead of wasting 5% of GDP on military spending that is neither necessary nor useful for Europe. Higher spending on the EGD has two advantages: First, it will bring regional and global benefits in terms of climate security. Second, it will strengthen Europe’s competitiveness in the green and digital technologies of the future, creating a new, sustainable growth model for Europe.

Ninth, the EU should work with the African Union to massively expand education and skills development in AU member states. Africa’s economic future will have a profound impact on the European economy, as its population will grow from 1.4 billion to around 2.5 billion by the middle of the century (compared to around 450 million in the EU). The best hope for African prosperity lies in the rapid development of higher education and skills.

Tenth, the EU and the BRICS countries should make it clear to the US that the future world order is based not on hegemony but on the rule of law within the framework of the UN Charter. Only in this way can Europe and the world be truly secure. Dependence on the US and NATO is a cruel illusion, especially given the instability of the US itself. Reaffirming the UN Charter, on the other hand, can end wars (e.g., by ending Israel’s impunity and enforcing the ICJ rulings on the two-state solution) and prevent future conflicts.

Jeffrey D. Sachs is a university professor and director of the Center for Sustainable Development at Columbia University, as well as president of the UN’s Sustainable Development Solutions Network.