[This discussion paper published in August 2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://nie-wieder-krieg.org/friedenspolitik-21-jahrhundert/.]
Marc Batko
From:marc1seed@yahoo.com
Happy Anti-War Day, September 1, 2024!
Peace policy for the world of the 21st century
A discussion paper
by the initiative NEIN Zu Kriegen
[This discussion paper published in August 2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://nie-wieder-krieg.org/friedenspolitik-21-jahrhundert/.]
Contents:
1. Understanding the upheavals in the international system
1.1. The USA remains a superpower
1.2. China as a superpower and the new role of the Global South
1.3. The re-emergence of Russia as a great power
1.4. The EU in the new world order
1.5. The German “turning point”
2. The central conflict on the way to a multipolar world order
2.1. Washington still wants to dominate the world order
2.2. Nuclear winter instead of global warming?
2.3. New US nuclear weapons against Russia on German soil
2.4. Democracy versus autocracy?
3. Resolving controversies in the peace movement
3.1 Democracy, human rights and national sovereignty
3.2 Contradictions between peace and human rights?
3.3 Exploiting human rights provokes a sense of entrenchment
3.4 War, morality and rationality
4. Updating the requirements for peace policy
Peace policy for the world of the 21st century
The international system is undergoing a period of upheaval of historic proportions. The dominance of the United States is coming to an end. A new hegemonic power will not emerge in the foreseeable future. A multipolar world order is emerging. None of the generations alive today is familiar with such a system from their own experience.
The upheaval raises new questions about war and peace. For example, about the positioning of the peace movement in the rivalry between the major powers, about the stability risks of a multipolar system, about the relationship between a country’s internal conditions and the international system, and about the connection between war and peace with the global problems of climate change, poverty, technological upheavals such as digitalization and artificial intelligence. We are dealing with an enormously increased complexity.
The task of peace policy at the cutting edge is to find answers to the new developments in the world order and to process them strategically.
The present text aims to stimulate discussion about the changes in the power-political structure and dynamics of the international system and the consequences for peace policy. [1] We do not claim to have covered the topic in all its dimensions. Comments, criticism and disagreement are welcome. What is important is that the discussion gets underway.
1. Understanding the upheavals in the international system
The central determinant of the structure and dynamics of the international system for the foreseeable future is its transformation into a polycentric system. The transformation is unstoppable. The geopolitical dominance of the US and its allies is ending. It is leading to the “de-Westernization” of the international power relations. This is the real turning point. A plurality of geopolitical power centers is emerging, but they have different weights.
1.1. The USA remains a superpower
The USA remains a superpower. It continues to hold a leading position in all essential power resources – military, economic potential, technology, political influence and soft power. With its military alliances and over 800 foreign military bases, with its corporations, the dollar as international currency, its secret services, media, and cultural industries, it has a unique presence throughout the world. NATO is a particularly important instrument in terms of power politics. It was founded by the United States and is under its leadership. No important decision can be made in NATO against Washington’s will. Washington is also currently forming a system of military alliances in the Indo-Pacific directed against China.
The availability of the full range of power resources gives Washington a variety of options for action like no other country, and constitutes an asymmetry in all external relations – with friends and enemies alike. This also means that the US can assert its interests more than any other country through power resources below the military threshold, including through technology and economic sanctions and many forms of political pressure. Economic sanctions can also have devastating and deadly effects. According to UN figures, at least half a million people died as a result of the embargo against Iraq between 1990 and 2003. Developing countries are particularly vulnerable. In addition to their favorite enemies China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, Nicaragua, North Korea, Venezuela, about 15 low-income countries are on Washington’s sanctions list. [3] The arrogance of power becomes particularly clear when the sanctions are imposed extraterritorially, i.e. against third parties, if they do not want to submit to Washington. Even the German government considers this to be a violation of international law – at least it did until the Nord-Stream II pipeline was blown up.
The extraordinary power also shapes the US elites mentally. Just as it is part of the essence of hegemony that those who succumb to its influence perceive it as the normal and quasi-natural, so the global leadership claim is a matter of course for the political class in Washington. Any questioning of this is perceived as a threat. Former President Obama, for example, said: “America must always lead on the world stage” … “I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my being” [4].
The disposition of power resources constitutes the balance of power in the international system and explains – not exclusively, but to a large extent – the foreign policy of a country.
1.2. China as a superpower and the new role of the Global South
At the center of the upheavals is the rapid rise of countries in the Global South, led by China. Its breathtaking development from a developing country to a superpower within two generations is a material, political and psychological provocation of Western superiority in general and the US’s claim to dominance in particular.
In terms of power resources, China is hot on the heels of the USA. Measured in purchasing power parities [5], the Chinese economy has even already overtaken the US, [6] even if, in terms of prosperity, per capita income, it has only reached the level of countries such as Serbia or Bulgaria. In military and technological terms, China is now a superpower, and its unparalleled development successes, particularly in the Global South, give it considerable soft power.
India, now the most populous country in the world, already has the third-largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. The Indian leadership is also openly formulating its claim to great power status. However, there is still a wide gap between aspiration and reality, and it may take some time before the country moves into the front row of world powers.
China and India represent the new global political significance of the Global South, where countries such as Indonesia, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and NATO member Turkey are also seeking to play a more geopolitically independent role. The Global South has become a factor in power politics today, far more than the Non-Aligned Movement was during the Cold War. 1.0. The West’s failure to draw it into its side in the Ukraine war is one indicator of many. Projects such as BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) aim to achieve “a more democratic and just multipolar world based on international law, equality, mutual respect, cooperation, joint action and collective decision-making by all states”. [7] Accordingly, it is not a matter of replacing one hegemon with another, but of questioning the principle of hegemony itself.
In other words, the self-organization of the Global South is objectively directed primarily against the hegemony of the USA and its entourage. This is what actually unites them. Otherwise, the Global South is not a homogeneous interest group. In some cases, there have even been armed conflicts between individual countries, such as between China and India, between Pakistan and India, or Armenia and Azerbaijan.
1.3. The re-emergence of Russia as a great power
Russia’s defeat in the Cold War also spelled the end of Russia 1.0. as a world power. Its attempts to move closer to the West after 1991 – even at the beginning of the Putin era – without simultaneously submitting to US hegemony have failed. The decisive factor here was that the US blocked the emergence of closer ties between the EU, or rather important member states, and Russia from the outset. The most important instrument in this was NATO’s eastward expansion. Although this represented a break with the principle of undivided, common security, it does correspond to an essential element of Washington’s foreign policy doctrine: to prevent at all costs “the emergence of a hegemon in Eurasia” [8].
In the 2000s, not only did a domestic consolidation begin, but with the modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces, its re-emergence as a great power also began. In the sector of strategic nuclear weapons, the country has superpower status. That means there is a strategic balance (of terror) with the United States. Even in the event of a nuclear first strike by the United States, Moscow would still be able to reduce the United States to ashes with its second-strike capability.
This is difficult for the US elites to bear. Therefore, there are always discussions about a decapitation strike that could be used to eliminate the Russian second-strike capability. NATO’s eastward expansion and, in particular, the potential admission of Ukraine is perceived by Moscow as an opportunity to do so. As a threat scenario, this is part of Russian military doctrine. Even without war, the decapitation capability would be an enormous means of exerting pressure to force good behavior. This is what Putin meant in his speech justifying the invasion of Ukraine: “Tomahawk cruise missiles would take less than 35 minutes to reach Moscow, 7 to 8 minutes for ballistic missiles from the Kharkov region and 4 to 5 minutes for hypersonic missiles. That’s what you call having a knife at your throat.” [9]
In all other power resources, starting with conventional military, Russia is far inferior to the USA. However, this should not lead to the kind of underestimation that is expressed in Helmut Schmidt’s saying about “Burkina Faso with nuclear missiles”. In the IMF’s global ranking based on purchasing power parities, Russian capitalism is in sixth place behind Japan and Germany, and well ahead of Great Britain (9th place) and France (10th place). It is significant that the ranking according to PPP rarely appears in the major media. But even according to exchange rate parity, Russia still ranks 11th (2023) – and rising. The misjudgements regarding the effect of sanctions are also a typical example of the notorious underestimation of Russia. The German Foreign Minister’s grandiose announcement that the country would be ruined proved to be a conceited illusion.
In the meantime, economic decoupling from the West has progressed to a considerable extent. Moscow has made turning away from the West a strategic goal of its foreign policy orientation. [10] This began even before the war in Ukraine and has accelerated enormously since 2022.
A strategic alliance has emerged with China based on complementary interests. Russia benefits from China’s superior economic power and technological know-how. Conversely, Beijing is interested in having a strategic partner, a politically stable neighbor and a supplier of important raw materials at their 4,000 km common border in the confrontation with the USA.
1.4. The EU in the new world order
In 1900, Europe accounted for almost a quarter of the world’s population. At present, the EU still represents 5.5%, which will fall to 4.5% by 2050. The center of gravity of the world economy has already shifted from the transatlantic area to East Asia. By 2050, the EU’s share of global GDP is forecast to shrink from 14% at present to 9%. [11] In 1980, it was still over 20%.
In a multipolar world order, the EU wants to be an independent pole, on an equal footing with the US and China. To this end, all policy areas are to be put at the service of geopolitical ambitions: climate, energy and raw materials, economy, technology, media, etc. The Strategic Compass states that “the full range of EU policies and their levers are to be used as instruments of power.” [12] Enlargement policy is also being used to acquire geopolitical power.
In the case of the EU, however, the difference between wanting and being able is particularly great. It is not a state, but a hybrid of a state alliance and supranational elements of statehood. With this complicated construction, it has significantly less capacity to act than a classic state. Weak growth and losses in competitiveness and cutting-edge technologies are putting the EU under enormous pressure, while internal contradictions and centrifugal tendencies are increasing, as the 2024 elections to the EU Parliament, among other things, showed.
In addition, NATO sets narrow limits on the EU’s geopolitical independence. In the essentials of international policy, this leads to subordination to the USA.
This is the intention of some member states, especially in the east. They trust the USA more than they trust the leading EU powers, France and Germany. Even with Trump, the subordination to the USA would not change fundamentally. Above all, he wants NATO Europe to bear a greater share of the costs of securing US hegemony and to shift the burden of the war in Ukraine. As long as NATO exists, the EU’s desire for autonomous world power status is likely to remain unfulfilled.
Against this background, the controversy over ‘strategic autonomy’ and ‘transatlanticism’ is an expression of fears of social decline: “The next decades will fundamentally challenge this continent, … I fear we will remain a foreign policy dwarf if we do not get out of unanimity,” [13] said Manfred Weber, leader of the conservative EPP faction in the European Parliament (EP). After 500 years of European colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism, this is a serious insult to the self-esteem of the functional elites and their sense of superiority. As early as 2016, a resolution of the EU Parliament stated that “the EU must strengthen its security and defence capabilities, as it can only use its full potential as a world power if it combines its unique ‘soft power’ with ‘hard power’ as part of a comprehensive EU approach” [14].
In such formulations, panic about relegation to the sidelines shimmers through. It is a strong driver of militarization and bellicism. Symptomatic of this is the new European Parliament’s resolution on Ukraine from July 2024, which is steeped in the spirit of militaristic slogans of perseverance, while the precept of diplomacy and negotiation under international law is not mentioned. [15] The nomination of Kaja Kallas, a fanatical hater of Russians, as foreign policy chief, fits in well with this.
1.5. The German “turning point”
The fear of social decline is also a concern for Germany’s functional elites. Federal President Steinmeier, for example, declared “self-assertion” to be the task of our time, because “rough, harder years” are coming [16].
Indeed, Germany is experiencing a decline in various areas. The economy is facing drastic structural adjustments, and it is not certain whether they will succeed. Decarbonization, which is sensible and necessary in itself, but without a coherent concept, the decoupling from Russian natural gas and thus from a decades-long competitive advantage, China’s competitive strength, lagging behind in digitization, signs of decay in infrastructure, inflation and falling real wages – all this threatens the future of Germany’s economic and social system.
But economic strength has been the foundation for Germany’s role in the EU and for a certain international standing. As this foundation begins to crumble, the military resource is now to be drawn upon to escape the geopolitical loss of importance.
It is not just about military hardware. Mentally, too, the old enemy stereotype of the danger from the east and the blatant historical misrepresentation are being dusted off. The public and other major media have become state-sponsored echo chambers of the new bellicism.
At the same time, it is implicitly recognized that the EU is insufficiently available as a military factor. That is why the nation-state card is now being played in parallel. This also has the advantage of gaining weight in the rivalry for leadership in the EU vis-à-vis France.
However, Paris has the atomic bomb and a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, which are assets that are out of reach for Berlin. Macron is trying to use this by offering the Force de frappe as a replacement for the US nuclear presence. This would offer a degree of strategic autonomy, but at the same time establish French hegemony in the EU. Neither Berlin nor the member states in the east want this. They prefer the transatlantic option.
This would shift the center of gravity of power politics in the EU from Western Europe to the east. Poland and the Baltic states see themselves as frontline states and derive from this a claim to more influence. Germany’s position in the EU has been strengthened thanks to its central geographical location, its strong economic presence in the eastern member states and its “turning point,” while the Franco-German axis is becoming less important. Berlin is promptly and openly asserting a claim to leadership, including from Klingbeil, the co-chair of the SPD: “Germany must have the claim of a leading power. After almost 80 years of restraint, Germany today has a new role in the international system.” [17] However, this claim to leadership only applies to the EU and does not question the subordination to US hegemony.
This will remain the case even after the war in Ukraine. However it turns out, the confrontation with Russia will remain for a long time and draw a new “iron curtain” through the continent.
Domestically, the “turning point” means that the lower classes will have to bear the costs. There is already a redistribution from the social to the military, while the profits of the arms industry are reaching ever new heights.
And, as always in such cases, democracy is also among the losers. True-to-conviction conformism is demanded. What used to be the patriotless fellow or traitor is now the Putin sympathizer and rag-tag pacifist, while hero kitsch, martial prowess and the cult of the fighter are becoming socially acceptable again. In the meantime, the commitment to NATO and rearmament has been elevated to a de facto “reason of state” along the lines of support for Israel. Those who do not go along with this risk being excluded from the permissible discourse.
2. The central conflict on the way to a multipolar world order
A multipolar world order is a step towards pluralization of international relations and real multilateralism. It expands the participation of emerging countries in decisions about the development of the international system. At the same time, the power of action of medium-sized and smaller countries increases. Leeway arises when simultaneous or alternating cooperation with different major powers becomes possible. ‘Multivectored foreign policy’ is the keyword here.
On paper, all of this already exists in the UN Charter, including the principle of the sovereign equality of all states and the prohibition of interference in internal affairs. However, the way the international system functions in terms of power politics has repeatedly ignored this in practice.
Of course, the upheaval also entails considerable risks. Historically, changes in the hegemonic order have often led to war. A Harvard study examined 16 such cases in world history. War broke out in 12 of them, including the two world wars. [18]
But even without war, multipolarity can easily lead to an increase in competition, tensions, instability and unpredictability. The core issue here is that the established hegemonic power is not willing to give up its dominant position and fit peacefully into the new order.
Unlike previous upheavals of this kind, the new development is that the geopolitical change coincides with risks from climate and other environmental problems that are unique in human history.
2.1. Washington wants to continue to dominate the world order
The USA is not willing to give up its dominance. The official security strategy of the Biden administration states: “There is no country better suited to lead with strength and determination than the United States of America.” [19] This is not just a claim; Washington is trying to put it into practice day after day. And not just since today. As early as 1992, it was declared that in the future, a rival like the Soviet Union would never again be allowed to emerge: “Our first goal is to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival in the territory of the former Soviet Union or elsewhere,” the so-called Wolfowitz Doctrine stated. [20] And even before the war in Ukraine, numerous official documents explicitly identified the main enemies: “China and Russia are the main threats to an era of peace and prosperity in the world,” according to the 2020 military doctrine of the US Navy, [21] for example.
Therefore, the international system cannot be understood without the actions of its most powerful player. This has nothing to do with anti-Americanism.
If China and Russia are declared the main enemies, it is not surprising that they are pushed to form camps, although China in particular is trying to avoid bloc formation by creating plural networks. The massive sanctions against China, especially in the high-tech sector, are intended to prevent it from catching up with or overtaking the USA. Tensions over Taiwan are escalating. At the same time, the USA is using its potential to create camps in the Indo-Pacific region with Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines. India is also to be drawn into the US camp – even if the prospects for this are rather slim.
With regard to Russia, the war in Ukraine has been transformed into a proxy war. The declared aim of the war is to weaken Russia as much as possible, both economically and militarily, in the hope of bringing about regime change in Moscow. However, the continuation of this war is preventing the US from fully concentrating on the fight against China.
To enforce its claim to hegemony over Beijing and Moscow, Washington primarily relies on the use of its military, technological and economic instruments of power, while a reconciliation of interests through political conflict resolution, negotiations and diplomacy remains out of the question.
2.2 Nuclear winter instead of global warming?
With the invention of the atomic bomb, for the first time in the history of mankind, there existed a weapon capable of wiping out the entire species of homo sapiens. Under the shock of the Cuban missile crisis, treaties for arms control were signed, which, together with the balance of terror, made a certain stability and relaxation possible. But now we are back to a highly dangerous situation: the treaties have been terminated, starting with the termination of the ABM Treaty by the Bush administration in 2001, and there are new, completely unregulated technologies whose military application creates incalculable risks, including the outbreak of war due to technical error.
Confrontation no longer takes place only on land, at sea and in the air, but also in space and in cyberspace. This further increases mistrust between the parties in conflict and leads to even more instability. The further the escalation is driven, the more likely a loss of control is at some point. The Ukrainian attacks on the Russian nuclear weapons radar for early detection of approaching nuclear weapons point to this risk.
If negotiations on arms control do not start soon, the world could face a nuclear winter instead of global warming.
The hot wars in Ukraine and the Middle East are already absorbing large material and political resources and capturing the public’s attention. As a result, the climate and environmental crises are being pushed into the background. The war in Ukraine caused CO2 emissions of around 120 million tons in the twelve months of 2023, which is roughly equivalent to the emissions of a country like Belgium [22]. Greenhouse gas emissions from the military worldwide are estimated to be at least 1,644 million tons and up to 3,484 million tons per year. That is 3.3 to 7.0 percent of global emissions. [23] And that’s just in ongoing military operations, not including current wars. That is roughly the output of a country like Russia or India. The military burdens were deliberately not included in the figures on which the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and the Paris Agreement of 2015 were based.
2.3 New US nuclear weapons against Russia on German soil
In view of the many escalations, the US decision to deploy Tomahawk cruise missiles, SM-6 medium-range missiles and the Dark Eagle hypersonic weapon on German soil from 2026 marks a new quality of escalation. Tomahawks and Dark Eagles can be equipped with both conventional and nuclear weapons and can attack targets throughout the European part of Russia, while the warning time is drastically reduced compared to the combat bombers deployed in Büchel as part of the so-called nuclear sharing.
Once again, this is a US measure on the territory of a third country that cannot be answered symmetrically by Moscow, e.g. by stationing missiles on Washington’s doorstep, as the Soviet Union did in Cuba in 1962 in response to US missiles in Turkey. The stationing shifts the strategic balance in favor of the United States.
And, in the logic of deterrence and counter-deterrence, it will lead to Russian measures that make Germany the preferred target of Russian missiles. By submissively accepting the deployment, which has been planned since 2021, the German government is exposing the country to a new nuclear threat – while Washington is 8,000 km away from the danger.
The official reason given for the deployment is the alleged existence of a ‘security gap’ due to the fact that Russia has been deploying Iskander medium-range missiles in its exclave of Kaliningrad since 2018, with a range of over 500 km. This is said to be a violation of the INF Treaty. [24] Moscow claims that the missiles only have a range of 480 km and are therefore in compliance with the treaty.
In the dispute, the German government is, on the one hand, concealing the fact that the United States installed the AEGIS/SM-3 missile defense system in Romania in 2016 and in Poland in 2018 [25]. Moscow views this as an impairment of the strategic balance. On the other hand, Washington did not respond to the Russian proposal of mutual verification of Iskander and AEGIS/SM-3.
The logic of deterrence can be seen in the course of the blame game: one’s own intentions are obscured, which is also declared rational policy with the lofty term “strategic ambiguity”, and the opponent is to be put in fear, while one’s own armament is labeled as a purely defensive measure. The result is an increase in tensions and insecurity on both sides.
2.4. Democracy versus autocracy?
Ideologically, the West justifies its policy of confrontation with the construct “democracy versus autocracy”. Invoking ‘values’ is intended to motivate a post-heroic population to be ready for war again. To do this, it is necessary to depict the opposing side as pure evil, a method that has been practiced for ages. “It’s about the difference between good and evil,” said Nikki Haley, former US ambassador to the UN, representing many others. [26]
However, a closer look reveals that the seemingly highly moral division of the world into good and evil is a double standard. The US security strategy mentioned above states: “The most urgent strategic challenge to our vision comes from powers that combine authoritarian governance with revisionist foreign policy.” It then introduces another category of autocracies: “Many non-democracies are joining the world’s democracies to renounce these [revisionist] behaviors.” [27] So it is not about autocracy as such, but about what Washington declares to be ‘revisionism’, i.e. the rejection of US dominance. One creates two types of autocracy: the revisionist ones in Beijing and Moscow, and the non-revisionist ones that are accepted as partners. Lars Klingbeil is also an advocate of such double standards: “It is clear that we must also work together with countries that do not share our values or even reject our social order.” [28]
The central contradiction in the international system is by no means that between autocracy and democracy, but rather that between advocating a non-hegemonic, multipolar world order on the one hand, and attempting to maintain US/Western dominance on the other.
The political function of the narrative of the contradiction between autocracy and democracy is to make plausible the dogma proclaimed in ancient times: “If you want peace, prepare for war!” However, this conceals its fundamental defect, namely that the opposing side thinks exactly the same way, and in this way the spiral of conflict is driven ever deeper. The example of medium-range weapons mentioned above shows the practical consequences.
In contrast to interest conflicts, there can be no compromises in moral conflicts. They resemble religious wars, unless one agrees – as in the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 – on the peaceful coexistence of different confessions. An ideological conflict between democracy and authoritarianism stimulates an escalation spiral of confrontation, arms race and cold war – until it comes to a loss of control, the hot war.
3. Resolving controversies in the peace movement
The narrative of autocracy versus democracy is still attractive in some parts of the peace movement and on the left of society. It is based on an originally emancipatory intention: to liberate the damned of this earth. The founding of “sister republics” by French revolutionary troops in the 18th century was already motivated by this. [29] There is an obvious affinity to this understanding of internationalism – for example, in the Communist International in its early years and its goal of world revolution [30] or Che Guevara’s attempt at revolution in Bolivia. However, under conditions of conflict and tension in the international system, foreign policy messianism from the left can be highly dangerous, especially when it converges with the ‘liberal internationalism’ that the West likes to use to justify an aggressive foreign policy.
3.1. Democracy, human rights and national sovereignty
In any case, a broad concept like democracy is always controversial, even within the peace movement. And it is questionable whether a consensus can ever be reached on it. This applies even more when it comes to the internal affairs of another country. This is not necessary either if one respects the UN Charter on sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs (in particular Article I, paragraph 2, Article II, paragraph 1 and paragraph 7). The Charter is based on the insight that, in view of different cultures, value systems and political systems, utter chaos and destruction would ensue if every country tried to impose its own ideas on others, let alone enforce them by force.
The same applies to human rights when the term is used as a battle cry for geopolitical interests. The universality of human rights means that all member states are obliged to implement human rights in their own country (UN Charter, Article I, Paragraph 3). This also includes social human rights, which the West also tends to ignore. However, it is not a license for regime change from the outside, or even for a NATO war of aggression, as in 1999 against Yugoslavia, when the German foreign minister said that one had to “prevent a new Auschwitz”. Moscow’s justification for invading Ukraine, to liberate the country from fascism, also falls into the category of unilateral presumptuousness to intervene in another country.
The UN Charter (Art. VII) only provides for precisely defined exceptions in extreme cases such as genocide. Accordingly, only the UN Security Council can authorize the use of force against a country. This also applies to the so-called Responsibility to Protect, which was in vogue in the noughties when Western hegemony still seemed unbroken. [31] The hurdles for intervention are very high, not least due to blockades in the Security Council. This is always loudly lamented when Russia vetoes. The situation is different when the US vetoes, as in the case of Israel. However, the decision for a ceasefire in Gaza on June 10, 2024, shows that there is another way; even if the decision was not implemented by Israel – with Western tolerance – any more than the resolutions of the General Assembly were implemented in many other conflicts.
In Germany, there are political currents that have a very distant relationship to national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference. They cite the experience of the excessive nationalism of German history – and in this respect they are typically German. However, the high value placed on sovereignty and non-interference in international law is a reaction to the long history of the subjugation and exploitation of foreign countries in colonialism, imperialism and neocolonialism. This is not forgotten in the Global South.
Moreover, the West itself is extremely sensitive when it believes that other countries are interfering in its internal affairs. However, in the case of the possible outrage over actual or alleged disinformation and cyber attacks from Russia and China, it is often difficult to distinguish between fact and fake, between reality, propaganda and conspiracy theory.
3.2. Contradictions between peace and human rights?
The ideological charging of interstate relations with unilateral value orientations leads to the assumption of fundamentalist contradictions and the search for strategies to contain or completely eliminate the other side.
Of course, the stoning of adulterers in Saudi Arabia, the theocracy of the mullahs and the Taliban, the discrimination against religious, ethnic, political and other minorities in many parts of the world – including in the West – is hard to bear. Criticism and protest from civil society is, of course, legitimate. Internationalist solidarity with pacifists, conscientious objectors and other opponents of war who are exposed to repression and persecution also remains on the agenda for the peace movement. However, it must clearly distance itself from the geopolitical instrumentalization of human rights by governments or militaristic forces.
Moreover, peace policy is per se a human rights policy, because the inhuman brutality of war, the dead, maimed and traumatized, the war crimes and the social and political consequences of destruction and hatred are the most serious violations of human rights.
Human rights issues are often linked to the right to self-determination of minorities, especially when minorities are subject to discrimination. When they seek independence, this can lead to serious conflicts, in which the right to self-determination comes into conflict with the right to territorial integrity of the majority state. Some spectacular examples are Kurdistan, Kosovo, the wars between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Cyprus or Western Sahara, but also Catalonia or Scotland. And, of course, the Taiwan and Palestine issues. In Ukraine, too, the right of self-determination of the inhabitants of Crimea and Donbass is an important component of the conflict. Such conflicts become even more explosive when they are exploited by foreign powers as part of their geopolitical interference.
3.3 Exploitation of human rights provokes a sense of entrenchment
The geopolitical instrumentalization of democracy and human rights creates permanent tensions in the international system. However, a climate of confrontation also leads to the emergence of authoritarianism and repression in a country that feels threatened, or to a further intensification of such tendencies where they already exist. The “waggon circle” phenomenon occurs, i.e. defensive posturing towards the outside world always leads to pressure to conform internally.
This applies to all sides. The EU’s ban on Russian radio stations and newspapers and the cancel culture against everything Russian, or even the German “reason of state” in the Gaza war have not yet reached the same level of authoritarianism as in Ukraine and Russia, but basically the same logic of the circle of wagons applies here.
The internet and the integration of cyberspace into the confrontation are creating a new dimension. Here, too, the USA is leading the way. According to official data, its intelligence system – 18 institutions with over 800,000 employees – had a budget of $99.6 billion in 2023, of which $27.9 billion was for the military. [32] By way of comparison, Russian military spending in 2023, the second year of the war in Ukraine, totaled $109 billion. [33]
3.4. War, morality and rationality
Closely related to the narrative of autocracy versus democracy is the way in which conflict and war are dealt with in exclusively moral categories. This leads to a convenient reduction of a complex reality to two variables: “good” and “evil”. These, in turn, are usually based on long-established enemy images and archetypal clichés, such as the ‘danger from the east’ or the image of David & Goliath. In this, for example, ‘David Ukraine’ becomes the victim of ‘Goliath Russia’. Especially among many young people, there is also the perception of ‘Goliath Israel’ against ‘David Palestine’! These are strategies of removing one’s own identity from the real contradictions and submitting to one side or the other. This makes an autonomous peace movement impossible.
Morally justified partisanship is also attractive because it conveys a sense of superiority. Because, of course, “we” are “the good guys”. Morality then mutates into self-righteous moralizing, as is very typically represented by the left-wing liberal avant-garde of bellicism, the militaristic mainstream and their narrative of “value-based foreign policy”.
However, morality is only credible as long as it is indivisible. Those who trample on international law themselves, such as NATO in Yugoslavia or the US-led “coalition of the willing” in Iraq in 2003 – including Ukraine, which provided the sixth largest troop contingent of 36 – practice double standards.
Double standards are also at play when it comes to the right to self-determination, e.g. for Kosovo or Taiwan. In these cases, the West’s enforcement of this right through war or military threats is considered justified, while the same process in the case of Crimea or Donbass is declared separatism and its military suppression is supported.
Hypocritical double standards also apply when it comes to the issue of annexations. The annexation of Northern Cyprus and parts of Kurdish-populated Northern Syria by NATO-member Turkey or of the Golan Heights and East Jerusalem by Israel have had no practical consequences for the West. The annexation of Western Sahara by Morocco was even formally recognized by the United States, contrary to clear UN resolutions, and France is in the process of joining it.
All this does not imply a plea for amorality. Even an emancipatory peace policy needs a moral compass. But if war is to be prevented or ended, moral outrage or even moralizing hatred does not help. On the contrary. Hatred generates counter-hatred and the longing for revenge, thus driving the spiral of violence ever further. Instead, one must rationally understand the causes of conflicts. Knowledge and rational insight are the preconditions for mature moral decisions.
4. Requirements for a peace policy in keeping with the times
The first task of a peace policy in keeping with the times is to understand the complexity of the new world order and to incorporate it into argumentation and practice. What is needed is an enlightened realism, a sober approach to geopolitics, albeit one based on peace policy values.
This includes taking a clear stand against the death and destruction of war and adhering to the UN Charter: diplomacy and political conflict resolution, cooperation, undivided, common security, sovereign equality of all states, peaceful coexistence, arms control and disarmament.
What is needed is a qualified examination of bellicism and militarism and their seemingly plausible arguments. The peace movement and the social and political left should not follow the siren songs of a ‘castle peace policy’, which the SPD engaged in during the First World War.
It is important to confidently avoid defamations such as ‘Putinversteher’, anti-Americanism and the abuse of anti-Semitism accusations, etc., which amount to banning thoughts and suppressing freedom of expression.
Peace policy does not identify with a country or camp in principle or permanently. This also applies to one’s own country/camp, i.e. rejection of nationalism, Euro-nationalism and identification with any circle of wagons, not even that of the West.
This does not preclude supporting proposals from one side in a specific case if they make sense in terms of peace policy. This also applies to corresponding initiatives from ‘enemy territory’.
In an interdependent world and under conditions of existential threat from weapons of mass destruction, the attitude “They’re all imperialists, we’re staying out of their business” is not an option.
The strategic autonomy of the EU, which amounts to becoming a classic great power, is not a peace policy option. What is needed is an autonomy that goes hand in hand with a different type of policy based on peace, coexistence, disarmament, common security and cooperation.
Even in pre-war periods, peace policy must include criticism of ideological enemy images, which create an essential prerequisite for aggressive foreign policy. To this end, it is also necessary to develop autonomous expertise on ‘the enemies’ so as not to be dependent on state-sponsored ‘experts’, self-proclaimed think tanks and relevant institutes.
It is the responsibility of the German peace movement to develop a different foreign policy for Germany. This is a task that no one can take from them and it must be the focus of their work. Their task is to counter the militarization of society, rearmament and the great power ambitions of the ruling bloc – be it in German, EU or NATO form.
Controversies within the peace movement should be dealt with objectively and in a spirit of solidarity, and should not lead to confrontation and mutual exclusion. There are limits to tolerance only with regard to right-wing extremist, nationalist, militarist and similar forces. [34]
The ruling politics lead to a dismantling of democracy and to social burdens, especially for the subaltern classes and strata. This must play an important role in peace policy arguments, not least because extremely important starting points for the formation of countervailing power lie here.
Despite intensive brainwashing by the state-sponsored media, the Cold Warriors of the turn of the century have still not succeeded in getting the population fully on their side. As surveys repeatedly confirm, there are still strong post-heroic attitudes and a rejection by large sections of the population of being trimmed to “war-readiness”.
This gives reason to be confident that the peace movement can become strong and influential again.
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