Outdated paradigms
The idea that military deterrence alone can guarantee long-term security is outdated.
Anyone who takes a look at Germany’s defense policy can easily see its fundamental strategy: rearmament and the build-up of military strength. Supposedly not to act aggressively itself, but to signal to other actors: Not with us, we are prepared. However, this principle is not only very one-dimensional, it also no longer corresponds to the reality of modern warfare, which is characterized by drones and AI. It is often asymmetrical and cannot be countered with a crude arms race.
[This article posted on 6/25/2025 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.manova.news/artikel/veraltete-paradigmen.]
Is strength enough to deter? Why ask such a heretical question at this particular moment? It is obvious that Russia could attack the Baltic states, Finland or even Germany in a few years’ time. And it is equally obvious that we will deter Russia through rapid rearmament, thereby securing peace and our freedom. In his first government statement on May 14, 2025, Chancellor Friedrich Merz outlined the security policy guidelines of the black–red coalition. He is counting on deterrence through defense capability and readiness. The lessons of the past are as simple as they are clear: “Strength deters aggression. Weakness, on the other hand, invites aggression.” This succinct formula is convincing and elegantly confirms the decision to allocate between 500 billion and one trillion euros in special funds for the reconstruction of the Bundeswehr, as it is so fondly referred to in the Bundestag.
Rebuilding the German army (Bundeswehr)
The Bundeswehr is to become the strongest army in Europe and arm Europe “against tyranny, military force, and the naked law of the strongest.” The road to this goal is likely to be longer and more difficult than Russia’s equally growing military capabilities, which are spurred on by Ukraine’s stubborn determination to defend itself and its ability to innovate in the field of weapon technology. After years in trenches reminiscent of the First World War, drone warfare has dramatically revolutionized the battlefield. And the new technical possibilities offered by artificial intelligence and remote control are far from exhausted.
When a drone costing 500 or 1,000 euros can destroy a tank worth 30 million, both the existing strategies of tank warfare and investments in new types of remote-controlled tanks are called into question.
Further massive problems before the Bundeswehr becomes the strongest army in Europe lie in the area of personnel. Voluntary service will not be enough to increase the number of troops from around 180,000, where it has been stagnating for some time, to 260,000 active soldiers and 200,000 reservists. The defense minister, the Bundeswehr leadership, and defense politicians in the Bundestag are therefore talking quite clearly about reintroducing compulsory military service, which has only been suspended anyway. Rebuilding the Bundeswehr from its current state of deficiency is an organizational Herculean task. It will take more than billions in funding to create enough barracks and training grounds, equipment ranging from boots to weapons, instructors, and the bureaucratic infrastructure. The Reservists Association recently admitted that although it has the names of up to one million former soldiers, their addresses have been lost for data protection reasons, partly because contact with the residents’ registration offices was discontinued in 2011.
Deterrence: successes and failures
A look at history cannot always be clear-cut because the sources are incomplete or, as is so often the case, written from the perspective of the victors.
The Roman motto that one must prepare for war—i.e., arm oneself and show strength if one wants peace—has mostly led to victory, not necessarily to peace.
The peoples subjugated by the Roman Empire’s technically and tactically superior army during its expansion did not always welcome defeat as liberation or as an invitation to join the superior Roman civilization.
The Punic Wars lasted from 264 to 146 BCE, while the Gallic and Dacian Wars and the Germanic campaigns lasted for decades and repeatedly inflicted considerable losses and defeats on Rome. That is why the oft-quoted “Si vis pacem, para bellum” is better understood as an imperialist credo than as a panacea against external threats.
From ancient times to the present day, most wars have been about territorial gains, in the Nazi version in World War II even about “living space,” but also about raw materials such as ores and oil. After the Second World War, despite their military superiority in Africa and Asia, the European colonial powers suffered bitter defeats against poorly equipped “natives”: the Dutch in Indonesia, the French and Americans in Vietnam, the French and British in Africa – the list is long. These were all asymmetrical wars with high losses on both sides, but now even comparably well-equipped opponents, such as in the war in Ukraine, are becoming increasingly asymmetrical.
AI-supported weapon technology, drones, and cyber warfare are raising serious doubts about the concept of military strength and its deterrent effect.
Ukraine’s “Spiderweb” operation, with the destruction of various Russian air bases, has once again dramatically highlighted the asymmetry of modern warfare, but it has not necessarily strengthened Ukraine’s defenses.
Necessary priorities for Germany
The billions are available, even if they consist of loans that will have to be repaid at some point.
Those responsible for defense policy and the leadership of the German Armed Forces should be aware that material armament and personnel levels must be adapted to new developments in warfare. This puts the question of how many tanks, fighter jets, frigates, or cruise missiles we need into perspective, at least to some extent. Our foreign policy should also prioritize finding ways to monitor tensions and reduce them where possible.
Support for Ukraine, second only to the US, has apparently led to an unusually hostile mood toward Germany in Russia, both among the leadership and, according to the latest polls, among the population. Although Chancellor Friedrich Merz emphasizes that “we are not a warring party,” the scope and cost of aid to Ukraine are perceived as such in Russia. Military strength is always linked to arms exports, and Germany ranks fifth in this area with a market share of 5.6 percent, behind the US (43 percent), France (9.6 percent), Russia (7.8 percent), and China (5.9 percent). In 2024, the German government approved arms exports worth 13.33 billion euros, more than half of which (8.15 billion euros) went to Ukraine.
Politicians will only define the threat posed by Russia as “possible” or “conceivable” in a few years’ time, and for the most part not yet as imminent. Of course, one of the most important tasks of government is to avoid risks. However, uncertainty has long since taken hold among the population. Insofar as articles about the war in Ukraine still allow letters to the editor, a clear division is emerging. Skeptics are attacked as Putin sympathizers and the danger posed by “the Russians” is emphasized. Eighty years ago and long after that, it was “Ivan.”
Preparations for a possible emergency are being pushed forward in parallel. In the Süddeutsche Zeitung, the president of the Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) estimated the financial requirement for the construction of bunkers and shelters over the next four years at at least ten billion euros, and at 30 billion in ten years. Subway stations are to be expanded accordingly, as are private basement rooms, where business is already booming. According to Spiegel, a Berlin construction company is selling armored steel fixtures with price tags of up to 375,000 euros. How much all this contributes to the strength that is supposed to deter attackers is not yet clear.
Overall, however, deterrence no longer seems to be what it has always promised to be, militarily and politically, namely protection against attack. Deterrence still works as usual when it comes to your breakfast egg, but in recent decades, important parameters of warfare have shifted so dramatically that the promise of security is becoming increasingly expensive, if not impossible to deliver. At the NATO leadership meeting in Brussels on May 5, 2025, US Secretary of State Pete Hegseth and Secretary General Mark Rutte agreed that 5 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of all participating countries would be enough to provide security against “anti-Western aggression” for one billion people in the NATO area. This 5 percent would amount to $2.74 trillion per year, and extrapolated to Germany’s 2025 GDP alone, it would be $226.5 billion. That is roughly the same as citizen’s income, pension subsidies, and asylum costs combined — in other words, unaffordable.
Wolfgang Sachsenröder, born in 1943, has worked as a political advisor in Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Europe and has lived in Singapore again since 2008. He is particularly interested in Southeast Asia, whose politics he has observed and commented on for a total of 25 years. In his latest book, he describes the history of the opium trade and its political consequences to this day: “From Opium to Amphetamines — The Nine Lives of the Narcotics Industry in Southeast Asia,” published in April by WorldScientific. In his blog partyforumseasia.org, he sheds light on political developments in the region.