“Prevent a world war with nuclear weapons at all costs!” – Exclusive interview with Dmitri Trenin

[This interview posted on September 25, 2024 is translated from the German on the Internet, https://www.nachdenkseiten.de/?p=121947.]

Russia has nowhere to retreat to because the West is fighting an existential battle against the country. Moscow wants to wage this war more intelligently than in the days of the Soviet Union. In an interview, the renowned Russian political scientist and former head of the Carnegie Institute in Moscow, Dmitri Trenin, explains the key Russian views on the continuation of the war and the possible impact of the US presidential elections. The interview with Dmitri Trenin was conducted and translated by Péli Éva.

The upcoming deployment of US missiles in Germany is provoking Russia in a way never seen before. Germany is not willing to advocate for a new agreement to reduce the Russian threat. This may lead to reactions that no one wants. Political scientist Dmitri Trenin, one of Russia’s leading foreign policy experts, draws attention to the possible consequences.

Éva Péli: How do you assess the current situation in Ukraine, some two and a half years after the Russian troops invaded?

Dmitri Trenin: It is a war of attrition. Russian troops are “crushing” the Ukrainian army and advancing slowly but steadily in Donbass; Russian aerospace forces are “switching off” Ukraine’s military-industrial and energy facilities. The Ukrainian Armed Forces put up stubborn resistance and strike at vulnerable points in the Russian position – for example, in the Kursk region. Ukrainian drones damage Russian energy facilities and infrastructure. The Ukrainians also attack civilian facilities and organize acts of sabotage to undermine Russian morale. Despite the enormous and comprehensive support of the West for Kiev, Russia still has the advantage and largely holds the initiative in the theater of war. It is not a “stalemate”: the intensity of military activity is high, and the West’s efforts to prevent Ukraine from losing are logically leading to a further escalation of hostilities. Generally speaking, it is clear that Ukraine will lose without ever-greater Western support, but the ever-greater Western involvement in the war risks turning into a direct military clash between the West and Russia, that is, a world war with the almost inevitable use of nuclear weapons.

So you think that nuclear deterrence won’t hold?

Escalation to the nuclear level is very real. To believe that it is possible to teach a nuclear superpower a strategic defeat is madness. The old strategy of nuclear deterrence has proven flawed in an environment in which the enemy (the US) has repressed its fear and is convinced of its own resilience. It used to be hard to imagine that one could fire at nuclear facilities, as Ukraine is constantly doing, without the West not only condemning it but also warning of the dangers of such actions. I also increasingly have the impression that the U.S. views the option of a limited nuclear war in Europe as fundamentally acceptable – provided that this war does not affect the U.S. itself.

How do you think this war will end? What are the chances of negotiations today? Former Bundeswehr General Harald Kujat said in a recent interview that one solution could be for the warring parties to return to the negotiating table without preconditions and build on the results of the negotiations in Istanbul in spring 2022. What do you think of that?

There are various scenarios:

1. The war in Ukraine can turn into a world war, with the use of nuclear weapons and global destruction. This scenario must be avoided at all costs.
2. The war could end the moment one side (say Russia) launches a nuclear strike (or series of strikes) against a NATO country (countries) in response to those countries’ direct involvement in the war against Russia. In my opinion, we are now moving towards this scenario.
3. If the instinct of self-preservation prevails in the Western countries led by the US and their support for Ukraine is limited, the war will end in Russia’s victory. Russia’s victory will mean the realization of the objectives of the special military operation: removal of the Bandera regime in Kiev – denazification; demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine under reliable control of the Russian Federation; territorial changes, as a result of which Donbass, Novorossiya and probably some other regions will become part of Russia. (Editor’s note: In Russia, the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian armed forces are called Novorossiya, a crescent-shaped arc between the port cities of Odessa and Mariupol and the areas of Donetsk and Luhansk to the northeast.

Ending the war along the lines of the Korean model of 1953 is possible in principle, but it would only mean a breathing space with the prospect of the war being resumed in an even more decisive form. As far as I know, the Russian leadership is determined to resolve the Ukrainian question and not to freeze it.

As for Istanbul, an agreement between Moscow and Kiev was a real possibility at the time, but it was torpedoed by the United States through the United Kingdom. The Istanbul agreement is still relevant in terms of the principles of strict demilitarization of Ukraine and its non-accession to NATO. But since then, four regions have been admitted to the Russian Federation. This is no longer subject to negotiation.

The West continues to escalate and wants to allow the use of weapons that reach Russia in depth. How will and how can Russia respond to this? Where is the actual “red line”?

I hope that the US will realize that an escalation is a game of Russian roulette. A shot will be fired in any case, it is just not known how many times the trigger will be pulled. Regarding the “red lines”: the West and Ukraine have together crossed several lines that many used to call red. Technically, Russia has already had several reasons to use nuclear weapons, even under the existing – and in my view outdated – documents. A drone attack on a missile early warning system or a strike on a strategic airfield, for example, are among these reasons. Putin is obviously aware of his gigantic responsibility not only for Russia, but for all of humanity, and therefore shows an unprecedented and incredible patience. Russia’s opponents are mistaken if they mistake this patience for weakness. The “nuclear bullet” is already loaded into the cannon, so that with each round of escalation, a Russian retaliatory strike becomes more likely. I would advise everyone to remember Putin’s words from an interview with US journalists: “Why do we need the world if we don’t have Russia in it.” But where the last and real “red line” lies, only Putin knows. God forbid we should reach that line, let alone cross it.

According to observers, the Russian leadership is reacting relatively calmly to the Ukrainian incursion into the Kursk region. Others say it is reacting too little. How do you assess this?

Russia, of course, did not “lure” Ukrainian troops into the Kursk region. Most likely, Russia felt that attacking in that area was pointless and therefore impossible. However, the enemy acted, firstly, contrary to the logic of military strategy, and secondly, out of desperation. Zelenskyi, as is now clear, was counting on media success, on undermining Russian confidence in Putin, and on shifting Russian forces from Donbas to the Kursk region to stop the Russian offensive in Donbas. Of these three goals, only the first has been achieved, but its effect is short-lived. The Russian leadership has sent sufficient reserves to the Kursk region to stop the Ukrainian invasion, but not enough to quickly expel the enemy from Russian territory. As a result, Ukraine is suffering heavy losses without achieving any strategically or politically significant goal, while Russian forces in the Donbass are advancing. It would, of course, be good to quickly throw the Ukrainian troops back over the border and create a buffer zone (cordon sanitaire) on the other side of the border, but Moscow does not yet have the forces to do so: Putin does not want to declare a mobilization. The war, like the policy of which it is part, remains the art of the possible.

Sergei Karaganov said in a recent interview: “The main goal of the (nuclear) doctrine should be that all current and future opponents should be certain that Russia is prepared to use nuclear weapons in the event of an attack on our territory and our citizens.” And: “To possess nuclear weapons and not be able to convince the opponent to use them is suicide.” What is your assessment of your colleague’s current statements?

I agree with the theses of Sergei Karaganov that you have quoted. I think that a correction of the Russian concept and system of strategic deterrence is long overdue. The key point of the correction could be to lower the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence must become nuclear deterrence in the full sense of the word. If this does not happen and action does not follow words, the probability of a full-blown nuclear war will increase dramatically. The policy of the US and NATO countries, which is escalating the conflict more and more, is leading the world towards such a scenario. Europe is seen as a vassal of the US, willing to give up its own national interests in the name of the “common interests of the West” as defined in the US. Germany is the most obvious and blatant example here. As for geopolitical suicides, the Soviet Union has already committed such an act. I don’t think Russia will make the same mistake twice.

What are the arguments in favor of the deterrence calculation working and the change in Russia’s nuclear doctrine preventing the West from escalating further? No one would have thought before February 2022 that the West, and Europe in particular, would go so far in “supporting” Ukraine and be willing to ruin at least its own economy in the process.

So far, the West has proven that it will stop at nothing, including the use of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the political West has become accustomed to the idea that it can go to war without fear of retaliation, due to Moscow’s sluggish response to many provocations – such as the interruption of the Nord Stream pipeline, the sharing of intelligence information about Russian troops and facilities with Kiev, the shelling of strategic targets on Russian territory at the behest of the West, the invasion of the Kursk region at the behest of Great Britain and the United States, among other things – accustomed to the idea that he can wage war against Russia without fear of retaliation.

Russia is following the discussions in the West very closely – in my opinion, even too closely. But it is taking into account what can really influence the situation. First and foremost, these are the views and aspirations of the US political, military and intelligence elite.

Russia, as they say, needs “a lot of time to get ready”, but once it has harnessed the horses, it can quickly set off. I have a feeling that we are heading for a direct confrontation. If it comes to that, it will be a nuclear one. If Russia wins without the use of nuclear weapons, as Putin expects, it will emerge from the war with a different quality, well above that of the Russian Federation of 2021, despite the sacrifices and losses it has suffered.

What influence do statements like those made by Karaganov, who is considered an advisor to the Russian government, have on the Russian government? What do you see as the significance of the change in doctrine? After all, military experts say that Russia has not yet used many of the modern conventional weapons.

They are right: Russia is still waging the war very cautiously. Many obvious targets in Ukraine are not being attacked. Despite Russia’s overwhelming demographic superiority over Ukraine, the Russian army is outnumbered by the Ukrainian army on the battlefield. Putin is keen to preserve Russia’s peaceful order as much as possible. His priority is the development of the country, not war. Therefore, there are many stages of escalation that Russia must go through before using nuclear weapons to win the war with the collective West. But in any case, the lesson of Ukraine teaches us that passive nuclear deterrence must be replaced by active nuclear deterrence of the enemy.

How is Hungary’s policy of advocating a peaceful solution viewed in Russia?

There is a new word in Russian youth slang. It’s called “respect”. Hungary is respected for the fact that this small country has found the courage and strength to defend its national interests against the pressure of the globalists from Washington and Brussels. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is a symbol of both resilience and political dubiousness. No one considers him a pro-Russian politician, but everyone respects him as a promoter and defender of his country’s interests and values.

Which of the internationally expressed proposals for peace through negotiations do you consider realistic?

Seriously: President Putin’s proposals, which he presented at the State Department on June 14.

What is expected in Russia from the US elections and a possible election victory for Donald Trump?

Russia has no preferences here. Unlike 2016, no one hopes that if Donald Trump becomes president, relations with Russia will normalize. If Kamala Harris wins, US policy will be much the same as it is now, that is, more or less predictable for Moscow. If Trump becomes president, there will be surprises, not necessarily pleasant ones. In Moscow’s view, US policy is made by the “Deep State”, not by the president. Under the Democrats, it will remain very bad and dangerous; under Trump, we will have to expect unexpected shocks. In general, the Russian Federation is less and less oriented towards US policy: the US poses only threats to Russia, there are no partners there and there will be none in the foreseeable – or unforeseeable – future.

Former NATO General Harald Kujat is one of the most profound critics of Western policy. In a recent conversation, he said about a possible negotiated peace and its consequences for European security in the event of a Trump victory: This “could develop a peace and security order for Europe, with Russia and Ukraine in it…” How do you see the chances of that?

I don’t want to sound skeptical, but I see the chances of that as minimal. Those who really govern the US will block and sabotage every step Trump takes to reduce tensions with Russia. The possibilities are enormous, as we still know from Trump’s past presidency. If Trump seriously threatens the interests of these forces – for whom Russia is an eternal enemy that must be destroyed – he will be assassinated, just like John F. Kennedy (for the same reason). Trump himself, however, might radically change his position on Russia if his proposals to Moscow (which are unacceptable as far as I can tell) are rejected by the Kremlin.

What kind of security architecture in Europe together with Russia is possible after the war? The British political scientist Anatol Lieven said in a recent interview: “We can talk about that in 100 years.” What is your answer?

In principle, I agree with my friend Anatol Lieven here. A hundred or fifty or (to be optimistic) “only” thirty are not fundamentally important. This conflict between the West and Russia is much deeper and sharper than the Cold War. Those who win will stay alive, those who lose will disintegrate. That’s why I don’t care much about the architecture. There is not yet a foundation on which a building could be erected.

The West is arming itself and, despite all the facts, justifies this with a possible Russian attack on NATO. What is your assessment of this? And what do you think of Emmanuel Todd’s thesis that the West would rather destroy itself than let Russia attack it?

Western strategists know that Russia has no intention of attacking Europe, but the spectre of an aggressive Russia “at Europe’s gates” is very important for building a new reality in the West, much like George Orwell’s fantasies or prophecies. Everyone thought he was describing Stalin’s Soviet Union, but he was looking a hundred years into the future of the West.

Todd also writes in his current book on the “decline of the West” that Russia invaded Ukraine not because of Donbass, but because “he did not want Russia to be taken by surprise as it was in 1941 because it had waited too long for the inevitable attack.” This is what Putin is said to have said in his speech on February 24, 2022, in view of Ukraine’s increasing integration into NATO. What do you think of that?

In my opinion, in 2022 Putin was faced with a choice: either give in and allow the U.S. to do whatever it wants in Ukraine, putting increasing pressure on a Russia that just stands and squints, or solve the Ukrainian problem by force. In other words, he could choose shame and war – or engage in the fight. For eight years, Putin had hoped that he could solve the Donbass problem and thus the Ukrainian question together with Europe (Germany and France). Then it turned out that the then Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President François Hollande only wanted to buy time. In 2022, Russia’s president decided not to leave the problem to his heirs, but to try to solve it himself. He is still fighting, together with Russia.

In addition to the military proxy war on Ukrainian soil, the US-led West is waging an economic war against your country. What consequences does it have, in particular, for Russia’s position in the global economic structure? How long will it last, and could it be ended if the military war stops?

The sanctions pressure on the Russian Federation is very serious, but it was a bitter medicine for the Russian economy. It has managed to stay on its feet for the time being and has been able to adapt to the new conditions. Now it faces more difficult tasks: achieving technological sovereignty, increasing labor productivity, learning to produce again what the Soviet Union was able to produce but post-Soviet Russia has forgotten how to do. At the same time, Russia is striving to create elements of a new world order together with the countries that did not join the sanctions (we call them the world majority). This involves, for example, finance, logistics, standards, fair rules. Russia will not return to the world from which it was expelled from 2014 and especially 2022, regardless of when and how the war in Ukraine ends. But the previous global world order itself will change radically and probably be completely replaced.

Dmitri Trenin is scientific director at the Institute for the Military Economy and Strategy at the National Research University Higher School of Economics in Moscow and a leading researcher at IMEMO, the Institute of World Economy and International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Cover picture: Shutterstock

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